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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Convergence as a Means of Enabling Cross-Border Trading
"Cross-border trading" in the stocks of multinational companies is the
code word for the ability of all companies worldwide to be able to sell their
securities in the markets of all countries. In a cross-border trading
environment, the world's investment resources would be freely available to
companies in all countries and capital would be allocated in an optimal
fashion. One of the primary barriers to cross-border trading is the
requirement that the financial statements of the companies being traded in
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the securities markets of a particular country be compatible. With
comparable financial statements, multinational companies would be able to
access capital markets worldwide without being required to create different
financial statements that conform to the accounting requirements of
different countries. Investors would be better able to compare the financial
statements of all companies and would have the tools to make better
investment decisions. The world's supply of capital would be allocated
with more efficiency so that the cost of capital would decline.
The best method of facilitating financial statement comparability
would be that the financial reports of all companies be prepared according
to similar accounting principles. Ideally, all companies would use the same
accounting standards in their financial reports. The next best circumstance
would be that all companies keep their financial records in accordance with
accounting standards that are so similar that regulators and stock exchanges
worldwide would accept financial statements prepared in accordance with
differing accounting standards because the differences between standards
would be very small. This concept of differing but substantially similar
financial statements underlies the current movement towards "convergence"
of accounting standards world wide.
The concept of convergence of accounting standards was embraced by
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), in May
of 2000, as follows:
In order to respond to the significant growth in cross-border capital
flows, IOSCO has sought to facilitate cross-border offerings and listings.
IOSCO believes that cross-border offerings and listings would be
facilitated by high quality, internationally accepted accounting standards
that could be used b I incoming multinational issuers in cross-border
offerings and listings.
Convergence between U.S. accounting standards and accounting
standards prepared by international accounting standard setters is
particularly important. Since the United States has the world's largest
financial markets, many non-U.S. companies seek to sell their securities in
the United States. In a sense the term "cross-border trading" may mean the
ability to cross the U.S. border and sell securities in the U.S. market.
The desire to create a worldwide accounting system that will allow
foreign private issuers to sell and trade their securities in the United States
continues to be a key objective in the convergence process. The European
1 Resolution Concerning the Use of IASC Standards for the Purpose of Facilitating
Multinational Securities Offerings and Cross-Border Listings, IOSCO (May 17, 2000),
available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS26.pdf.
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Parliament and the Council of the European Union have stated the general
goal as follows:
It is important for the competitiveness of the Community capital markets
to achieve convergence of the standards used in Europe for preparing
financial statements, with international accounting standards that can be
used globally, for cross-border transactions or listings anywhere in the
world.
Dr. Alexander Schaub, Director-General, Internal Market and
Services of the European Commission, has described the need for
convergence as follows:
Through its adoption of IAS, the EU does not want to put its listed
companies at a disadvantage in the global economy. On the contrary,
listed EU companies need to be able to compete on an equal footing for
available financial resources in either European capital markets or in
world capital markets. In this context, it is particularly important to
achieve future convergence between IAS used in Europe for the
preparation of financial statements and other globally-used international
standards, in particular U.S. GAAP.
3
The goal of worldwide accounting standards accepted for trading in the
United States places special responsibilities on the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), since the SEC is the regulator with power to
determine whether financial statements prepared in accordance with non-
U.S. accounting standards can be used in the United States for the sale of
securities. At the present time, the SEC requires that financial statements
prepared in accordance with non-U.S. standards be "reconciled" to U.S.
standards. According to the SEC: "A foreign private issuer using
accounting standards other than U.S. GAAP must provide an audited
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. ' 4  Companies required to reconcile their
2 Council Regulation 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the Application of International
Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1-4, 5 [hereinafter IAS Regulation].
3 Dr. Alexander Schaub, The Use of International Accounting Standards in the EU, 25
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 609 (2005) [hereinafter Schaub]. Ernst and Young Global Limited
has stated with regard to the IASCF Constitution Review: "By far the most significant
remaining issue in relation to the global adoption of IFRS is convergence of U.S. GAAP
with IFRS." Comment Letter from Ernst and Young Global Limited to the IASC Foundation
2 (Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/2005-itc/cl 1 3.pdf.
4 SEC Concept Release: International Accounting Standards, Securities Act Release No.
33-7801, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42430, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 86,237, at liA. (Feb. 16, 2000) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release on lAS].
"Items 17(c) and 18(c) of Form 20-F permit a foreign private issuer to provide financial
statements in accordance with another comprehensive basis of accounting, provided that the
issuer also provides a reconciliation of net income and balance sheet items to U.S. GAAP."
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statements to U.S. accounting standards are, in effect, required to create a
second set of financial statements showing what their financial results
would have been had they been reported according to U.S. standards.
The SEC's Chief Accountant has recently acknowledged the SEC's
continued attention to the reconciliation issue, coupling the likelihood of
reconciliation with independent standard setting and high quality standards.
My personal view is that if things continue as they have been going - if
the IASB operates as a strong independent standard-setter and continues
to develop and issue high quality standards, if the commitment to quality
application of IFRS remains, and if good progress is made in accounting
convergence and the development of an effective global reporting
infrastructure - then I believe that the SEC will be able to eliminate our
reconciliation requirements.
5
B. High Quality, Transparent, and Comparable Standards
Since the purpose of creating converged accounting standards is to
allow worldwide cross-border trading, mere convergence of standards is not
enough. The converged standards should be high quality, transparent, and
comparable. The goal is to create standards that allow investors and
creditors to see the true financial condition of a company and to be able to
compare that company's financial statements to the financial statements of
other companies. Transparency and comparability objectives are not easy
to achieve, since many businesses have extremely complicated structures
and operations, and since comparisons between businesses are often
difficult. The goal of "high quality" contemplates a system for creating
accounting standards that will be effective in creating transparency and
comparability. As the SEC has stated:
High quality accounting standards consist of a comprehensive set of
neutral principles that require consistent, comparable, relevant and
reliable information that is useful for investors, lenders and creditors,
and others who make capital allocation decisions.6
Id. at note 13.
5 Donald T. Nicolaisen, SEC Chief Accountant, Remarks Before the IASB Meeting with
World Standard Setters 2-3 (September 28, 2004), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/
spch092084dtm.htm. See Mr. Nicolaisen's extended comments on convergence in Donald
T. Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 661
(2005).
6 SEC Concept Release, supra note 4, at II.A.
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C. The Current Convergence Environment
The two standard setters that have the most influence in creating global
accounting standards are the International Accounting Standards Board (the
IASB), a private standards setting organization that is subject to oversight
by the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (the
IASCF), and the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (the FASB),
also a private standards setting organization, that is subject to oversight by
the Financial Accounting Foundation (the FAF). The IASB and the FASB
are working actively to use the convergence process to create high quality
global accounting standards. They are cooperating with standard setters in
other countries to choose the best standards from those previously available,
to improve those standards, and to create new standards in a cooperative
environment.
The high quality goals of the convergence project are well expressed
by the IASCF's Constitution, which states that the objectives of the IASC
Foundation are, among others:
to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality,
understandable and enforceable global accounting standards that require
high quality, transparent and comparable information in financial
statements and other financial reporting to help participants in the
world's capital markets and other users make sound economic
decisions.
7
D. Independence and Representativeness
An effective system for creating accounting standards must be well
designed in order to meet its goals. For some, a well designed system
means that the standard setters should be independent of outside
commercial and government influence and therefore free to pursue high
quality standards. In doing so they must engage in "due process" by
seeking the views of the affected parties, including businesses, so that the
standards they create will not have unintended consequences. To others, a
well designed system should allow those affected by the standards to
participate in the standard setting process in order to prevent the standards
from unduly hindering business operations. They believe that in order for
standards to be effective they must be prepared by representatives of
affected interests, and that, if so prepared, the standards will be readily
acceptable.
These two views are referred to in this article as "independence" and
7 International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation Constitution (Jul. 2002)
(Revised), 2(a), available at http://www.iasb.org/about/constitution.asp [hereinafter IASCF
Constitution].
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"representativeness." The independence approach is that legitimacy should
be based on independence and competence. The representativeness
approach is that legitimacy should be based on geographical consensus and
approval.
This article supports the view that the requirement for success in
creating high quality, transparent, and comparable accounting standards is
that the standard setters should be independent of all business and
government special interests.
When a standard setter sacrifices independence and becomes subject to
influence from the companies required to comply with its standards, it is
likely that the quality of standards will suffer. If the world's standard
setters fail to adhere to the concept of independence, high quality converged
standards will not emerge. Most likely, economic and political pressures
will result in low quality standards, enabling companies to obscure bad
news, distort financial results, and prevent comparisons. Without
convergence the result most probably will be that government regulators in
various countries, most particularly the United States, will require financial
statements prepared according to non-converged standards to be changed
(or reconciled) to reflect the views of that country's regulators.
Fortunately, both the FASB and the IASB are committed to
independence. The IASB emerged in 2001 as an independent standard
setter after a substantial restructuring. The IASCF, which oversees the
IASB, is now completing a constitutional review that will preserve that
independent system. Meanwhile, the IASB and the FASB are pursuing a
cooperative program for preparing and revising standards in tandem,
bringing IASB standards, also called International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRSs), and U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) ever closer to full convergence.
8
This paper seeks to underscore the crucial point that as the
convergence of accounting standards gathers momentum, the IASCF should
maintain the IASB's independence. Part II describes the path of
independence established several decades earlier in the United States when
the FASB was created. It then explores the IASB's historical
transformation from an organization controlled by the accounting
8 New standards promulgated by the IASB are called International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRSs). The standards promulgated by the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC), the IASB's predecessor, were called International Accounting Standards
(lASs). All IASs remained in force when the IASC became the IASB in 2001, and the "IAS"
designation has been retained for them. ASs are from time to time amended by the IASB.
Thus, the entire body of standards now includes both 1ASs and IFRSs - for example, both
IAS 39 and IFRS 6 are current, valid standards maintained by the IASB. It is common for
accounting literature to use the term "IFRSs" to refer to the entire body of IASB standards.
This article will use the terms "IASB standards" or "IFRSs" to refer generally to the entire
body of standards without being time-specific.
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profession to an independent institution. Part III examines the progress
being made to sustain the IASB's independence through the IASCF's
current constitutional review. Part IV reinforces the importance of
independence by exploring three contemporary episodes: the IASB / FASB
collaboration in creating business combination standards; the U.S.
controversy over the expensing of stock options; and the European
controversy over the application of fair value accounting to derivatives.
The business combination episode demonstrates that independent standard
setters can produce converged high quality standards that benefit investors
and improve markets despite attempted interference by business interests.
The stock options and derivatives episodes demonstrate the danger that
when business and political interests interfere with standard setting, the
quality of standards may suffer and convergence may be derailed.
II. THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENCE AT THE FASB AND IASB
The International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation that
oversees the IASB is a London-based nonprofit private international
organization. It is the successor of the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC), founded in 1973. During the years following its
creation, the IASC grew from a vehicle for harmonizing accounting
practices throughout the world to an organization devoted to issuing
international accounting standards for use worldwide. In 1997, in reaction
to criticisms that it lacked the structure to meet the demands of setting
global accounting standards, the IASC began to restructure its standards
setting process.
During the restructuring process, the IASC encountered disagreement
regarding which model to adopt for its new structure. Some proposed an
independence model based on accounting standards set by highly qualified
full-time individuals who serve the public interest. Others proposed a
representativeness model based on an international organization composed
of country representatives.
The independence model can be traced back to the creation of the
FASB as an independent professional organization to promulgate
accounting rules for the American capital markets. 9 The representativeness
9 The primary references for the descriptions of the FASB and the pre-restructured IASC
were PAUL W. MILLER, RODNEY J. REDDING & PAUL R. BAHNSON, THE FASB, THE PEOPLE,
THE PROCESS, AND THE POLITICS (4th ed., Irwin/McGraw Hill 1998); THE IASC-US
COMPARISON PROJECT: A REPORT ON THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IASC
STANDARDS AND US GAAP (Carrie Bloomer ed., Financial Accounting Standards Board of
the Financial Accounting Foundation, 1st ed. 1996) [hereinafter IASC-US COMPARISON];
THE IASC-US COMPARISON PROJECT: A REPORT ON THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN IASC STANDARDS AND US GAAP (Carrie Bloomer ed., Financial Accounting
Standards Board of the Financial Accounting Foundation, 2nd ed. 1999) [hereinafter IASC-
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model can be traced to the IASC's original structure. In 2001, the IASC
agreed on a compromise structure that possessed traits of both models.
Under that structure, the IASB functions as an independent standard setter,
subject to supervision by the IASCF. The IASCF is composed of Trustees
who are representatives of various interests and geographic areas, but who
are committed to the independence model for the IASB.
This part of this article examines the backgrounds of both the FASB
and the IASC, and the manner in which those backgrounds have influenced
the structure and due processes of these organizations. After examining
varying views regarding a legitimate accounting standard setting process
and identifying the tension between independence and representativeness,
the article describes the IASC's current structure as it reflects resolution of
those tensions.
A. Independence and American Accounting Standard Setting
1. Origins of Independence and the Creation of the FASB
The prominence of U.S. GAAP is due in substantial part to the manner
in which those principles are developed by the FASB. The FASB is a
private sector accounting standard setting organization, which, like the
IASB, has no statutory authority. The FASB derives its authority to set
standards from the SEC, which delegated authority to promulgate
accounting standards to the FASB in 1973. °
US COMPARISON 2ND ED.]; and GARY J. PREVITS & BARBARA D. MERINO, A HISTORY OF
ACCOUNTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 5
(1998).
10 The SEC granted this authority in SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150. SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 C.F.R. 1260 (1974) [hereinafter ASR No. 150].
ASR No. 150 provides:
The body presently designated by the Council of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) to establish accounting principles is the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). This designation by the AICPA
followed the issuance of a report in March 1972 recommending the formation of
the FASB, after a study of the matter by a broadly based study group. The
recommendations contained in that report were widely endorsed by industry,
financial analysts, accounting educators, and practicing accountants. The
Commission endorsed the establishment of the FASB in the belief that the Board
would provide an institutional framework which will permit prompt and
responsible actions flowing from research and consideration of varying
viewpoints. The collective experience and expertise of the members of the FASB
and the individuals and professional organizations supporting it are substantial.
Equally important, the commitment of resources to the FASB is impressive
evidence of the willingness and intention of the private sector to support the FASB
in accomplishing its task. In view of these considerations, the Commission intends
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a. The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 and the AICPA Committee on
Accounting Procedure
The Securities Act of 1933" imposed stringent disclosure
requirements upon underwriters and issuers of new stock offerings. 2 The
Securities Exchange Act of 193413 created disclosure and reporting
requirements for the trading markets and created the SEC with the power to
set accounting standards. 14 Independent standard setting was first attempted
by the Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP), established by the
American Institute of Accountants (AIA), a private organization comprised
of professional accountants, at the urging of the SEC. 5 Although the AIA
cooperated with the SEC, a tension existed because the SEC believed that
accounting rules should be designed solely to meet the needs of investors in
public companies, while the AIA argued that this constituency represented a
small population of financial statement users and that most businesses did
not use financial statements to provide information to investors.16
b. The Accounting Principles Board and the 1972 AICPA Study
Concerned with the CAP's structure and efficiency, the American
Institute of Public Accountants established the Accounting Principles Board
(APB) in the fall of 1959 to replace the CAP. 17 The APB was to be a
formal research organization within the AICPA that would seek the active
cooperation of the academic accounting community.' 8  Weakness in the
operation of the APB, including inadequate research, led the AICPA to
evaluate the APB in its 1972 Report of the Study on Establishment of
to continue its policy of looking to the private sector for leadership in establishing
and improving accounting principles and standards through the FASB with the
expectation that the body's conclusions will promote the interests of
investors.. .For purposes of this policy, principles, standards and practices
promulgated by the FASB in its Statements and Interpretations will be considered
by the Commission as having substantial authoritative support, and those contrary
to such FASB promulgations will be considered to have no such support."
See also MILLER ET AL., supra note 9. Miller provides an in depth description of the FASB.
Some portions of this paper refer extensively to Miller's description.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2005).
12 See generally Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance:
You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996).
"3 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (2005).
14 Id.
15 MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 55-58.
16 PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 9, at 277.
17 MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 57.
18 PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 9, at 311.
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Accounting Principles (AICPA Study), 19 prepared under the leadership of
Francis Wheat, a former SEC Commissioner.20  The AICPA Study
concluded that the APB's research was inadequate,21 that it did not have
substantial academic representation, that its membership was overly
concentrated in public accounting firms,22 and that it lacked convincing
authority because of its large size (seventeen to twenty-one members) and
the fact that members were part-time and not perceived as independent.23 In
addition, the AICPA Study criticized the APB's openness and
responsiveness.
24
The AICPA Study called for a more independently structured
25accounting standard setter. In response to this recommendation, the APBwas disbanded and the FASB was established in 1973.26
2. The FASB
The FASB's mission is "to establish and improve standards of
financial accounting and reporting for the guidance and education of the
,,27public, including issuers, auditors, and users of financial information.
The underlying objective of the FASB's mission is to satisfy the needs of
financial report users by providing information that is useful for reaching
economic decisions that improve the efficiency of capital markets' resource
'9 ESTABLISHING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, Report of the Study on
Establishment of Accounting Principles 31 (American Inst. Of Certified Pub. Accountants
1972) [hereinafter AICPA Study].
20 The AICPA Study was preceded by then SEC Commissioner Francis Wheat's report:
A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies Under The '33 and '34 Securities Acts:
Report and Recommendations to the Securities and Exchange Commission from the
Disclosure Policy Study of 1969 ("Wheat Report"), which engaged in a broad reexamination
of the SEC's disclosure policy. The AICPA Study is frequently referred to in the accounting
literature as the "Wheat Committee Report."
21 AICPA Study, supra note 19, at 34.
22 id.
23 Regarding these weaknesses, the AICPA Study noted:
All members of the APB, including its chairman, serve in a part-time capacity. Most
members appear to devote from one-half to two-thirds of their time to the Board's work.
Most members of the Board are supported by an advisor, who normally also attends Board
meetings, and other support is provided by their firms. None of this work is compensated by
the institute. Out-of-pocket expenses of members and their staffs are defrayed by the institute
if reimbursement is requested. Usually, it is not. Id.
24 Id. at 35.
25 Id. at 69.
26 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 22. The SEC supported the establishment of the
FASB and delegated its standard setting authority to the FASB. See ASR No. 150, supra
note 10.
27 IASC-US COMPARISON, supra note 9, at 41.




The FASB Board consists of seven full-time independent members. In
order to ensure independence and objectivity, all Board members are
required to relinquish previous employment ties and to comply with the
restrictions the FASB imposes upon Board members' investing activities2
9
and future employment.30  The FASB has no formal composition
requirements, but the usual makeup includes three individuals from public
accounting, two industry representatives, one education specialist, and one
user of financial reports.3' To ensure independence, the FASB's members
receive a competitive salary and are required to file quarterly reports
disclosing relevant information regarding personal investments.32
b. FASB's Oversight: The FAF
Oversight of the FASB is provided by the Financial Accounting
Foundation, the FASB's parent organization,33 a nonprofit private
organization incorporated in Delaware. The FAF is also responsible for
selecting FASB members, members of the Financial Accounting Standards
Advisory Committee (FASAC), and members of its technical advisory
committee, the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF). It has no power to
interfere with FASB standard setting or to control the FASB's agenda.34
The FAF's sixteen member Board of Trustees meets at least four times
a year.35 The FAF's agenda is announced publicly and its meetings are
public except for confidential matters, such as the selection of FASB
members.36 The FAF's Trustees can serve no more than two terms of three
years each.37 Thirteen of the sixteen Trustees are elected by the Trustees
then in office. Eight of these Trustees are usually elected after nominations
are made by six sponsoring organizations from public accounting, finance,
industry, and academia.38 Five Trustees are elected by the Trustees as at-
28 Id.
29 Id. at 43.
30 id.
31 MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 40.
32 Id. at 39.
33 IASC-US COMPARISON, supra note 9, at 50; see also FASB, Financial Accounting
Foundation, available at http://www.fasb.org/faf' (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
34 IASC-US COMPARISON, supra note 9, at 50.
35 MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 35.
36 id.
37 Financial Accounting Foundation Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, Ch. A, art. I-A
§ 3 [hereinafter FAF Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws].
38 Id. at Ch. A, art. I-A § 4. The nominating organizations are the Securities Industry
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large members. 39  Three of the Trustees are financial officers or elected
officials of state or local governmental entities and are elected directly by
two organizations of government officials.40 Of the eleven Trustees who
are not at-large members, three must be public accountants in private
practice and two must have extensive experience as financial executives,
one as an investment professional, one as an accounting educator, one as an
investment banker, and three as financial officers or elected officials of state
or local government entities.
Prior to 1996, there were only three at-large Trustees. In 1996, Arthur
Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, criticized the FAF for lack of inde pendence
and insisted on changes in the Trustee appointment process." After
negotiations with the SEC, two new at-large members were added by
reducing AICPA representatives from four to three and reducing Financial
Executives International (FEI) representatives from two to one. The
government members were considered to represent the public, 42 so that
today, assuming that the nominee of the American Accounting Association,
whose members are academics, is counted as a public trustee, nine of the
sixteen trustees can be treated as representing the public.
3. The Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Committee
Input from preparers and users of financial statements is provided to
the FASB by the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Committee
(FASAC). The FASAC provides general advice regarding current and
Association (SIA), the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR),
Financial Executives International (FEI), the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA),
the American Accounting Association (AAA), and the AICPA (three nominees). 1d. The
Articles and Bylaws of the FAF were amended by the Trustees in 2002 to remove the right
of the six sponsoring organizations to elect Trustees, instead giving them the right to
nominate persons of Trustees, reserving the right of election to the Trustees, who may
choose Trustees who were not so nominated. This change was intended to enhance the
independence of the Trustees from the sponsoring organizations.
" Id. at Ch. A, art. I-A § 6.
40 Government representatives are members of the FAF Board of Trustees because the
FAF is also charged with responsibility of supervising the Government Accounting
Standards Board, which promulgates standards for state and local municipalities. The two
organizations are the Government Finance Officers Association and the National Association
of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers. They elect persons nominated jointly by nine
associations of government officials. When the FAF articles and Bylaws were amended in
2002, the government entities retained the right to elect the three government officials. Id. at
Ch. A, art. I-A § 4.
41 MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 37. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt is reported to have
threatened to withdraw the power delegated to the FASB in Accounting Series Release 150
if the FASB did not restructure itself sufficiently to produce a majority of public
representatives. Id.
42 id.
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potential agenda projects, priorities, major technical issues, and policy
matters.43 The FAF's Trustees appoint FASAC members, and the FASAC
operates independently from the FASB. 44  The number of FASAC's
members varies from year to year, but usually ranges from the bylaw
minimum of twenty members to approximately thirty members. FASAC
members are selected from a variety of constituencies, including users, the
46public, auditors, and preparers.
4. The Emerging Issues Task Force
The Emerging Issues Task Force is charged with resolving
"implementation, application and other emerging accounting issues that can
be analyzed within existing GAAP. 4 7 EITF interpretations are reached by
consensus and are ratified by the FASB at open FASB meetings. FASB
Board members participate in EITF meetings. The EITF is composed of
accounting experts "in a position to be aware of emerging issues before they
become widespread and before divergent practices regarding them become
entrenched."4 8 Its membership is drawn from a range of auditors, preparers
and users, and includes several members of the "Big Four" accounting
firms.4 9 It is chaired by the FASB's director of Research and Technical
Activities.5 The SEC's chief accountant or a deputy participates in each
51meeting.
5. FASB Due Process
The FASB believes that acceptance of its standards will depend in part
upon its willingness to allow public comment and participation in standard
setting, sometimes called "due process." These due process procedures
include a number of steps designed to allow public input. The FASB
process for creating accounting standards involves: issue identification;
preliminary evaluation, usually including input from preparers, users,
auditors and the SEC; careful selection of agenda items; possible public
hearings; publication of a preliminary news document; publication of an
exposure draft; informal consultations; receipt of comment letters; review
43 IASC-US COMPARISON, supra note 9, at 52.
44 MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 20.
45 id.
46 Id. at 43.
47 FASB Emerging Issues Task Force, available at http://www.fasb.org/eitf/
about eitf.shtml (last visited March 31, 2005).
48 Id.
49 See FASB, Emerging Issues Task Force, Members as of September 2004, available at
http://www.fasb.org/eitf/eitfmembers.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
50 FASB, Emerging Issues Task Force, General Information, supra note 748.
51 Id.
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by the FASAC; and publication of the final FASB standard.5 2 In addition,
project specific advisory groups are frequently appointed from FASB
constituents to provide insight and to debate technical issues.
53
6. FASB Funding
Until 2003, funding for the FAF and the FASB was provided by
contributions from accounting firms and businesses, placing significant
responsibilities on the FAF Trustees and raising the possibility that
businesses would decline or cease to contribute because they were unhappy
with standards adopted by the FASB. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
provided that an annual accounting support fee for the FASB would be
collected from corporations registered with the SEC in order to "provide for
an independent, stable source of funding" for the FASB.54
B. The IASC
The FASB model, including an independent full-time FASB, public
oversight by the FAF, advice from the FASAC and the EITF, and extensive
due process provided a strong contrast with the IASC as it existed prior to
2000.
1. Background to the JASC Reorganization
Prior to its reorganization in 2000, the IASC's members were the
professional accounting bodies that were members of the International
Federation of Accountants (IFAC). As of 1999, the 1ASC had 133
members from 103 countries.56 The IASC's governing Board, which
promulgated IASC standards, consisted of sixteen members. Thirteen
members were countries designated by IFAC and three were organizations
designated by the IASC Board: the International Council of Investment
Associations; the Federation of Swiss Industrial Holding Companies; and
the International Association of Financial Executives Institutes.57
Observers permitted to participate in the deliberations, but not to vote,
52 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 67-78.
53 IASC-US COMPARISON, supra note 9, at 53.
54 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §7219e(l) (2004).
55 See IASB, History, available at http://www.iasb.org/about/history.asp (last visited
Mar. 9, 2005). IASC's relationship with IFAC was set out in mutual commitments signed in
1982. Under the commitments all members of IFAC were automatically also members of
IASC, and the IASC Board was required to discuss proposed changes to its constitution with
IFAC. International Accounting Standards Committee Strategy Working Party, Discussion
Paper: Shaping the IASCfor the Future (Dec. 1998) 106-07 (on file with Professor Ruder)
[hereinafter December 1998 SWP Paper].
56 IASC-US COMPARISON 2ND ED., supra note 9, at 9.
" Id. at 12.
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included the European Commission, the FASB, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the People's
Republic of China."
Each IASC Board member had one vote and could designate two
voting representatives and one technical representative. As a result,
meetings of the IASC Board at which IAS standards were adopted were
inefficient, with as many as 60 or 70 persons having speaking privileges
participating in each meeting. The IASC structure also had problems
because IASC representatives served only as part-time volunteers and
maintained their employment positions.5 9 The members served renewable
terms of no more than five years. The usual professional background of the
IASC members was one-half from public accounting, one-fourth from
industry and the remainder from accounting education or the financial
analyst community.60
Although the IASC's constitution required that Board members act in
the public interest,61 the IASC, like the early U.S. standard setters, was
subject to criticism for lack of independence. Its large part-time Board
consisted of members who were representatives of countries or
organizations, with a likely tendency to represent and vote the views of
their country or organization rather than act solely in the public interest.
62
2. IASC Due Process
Prior to its reorganization, IASC's due process was subject to criticism
as not sufficiently open to the public. Initial drafting was done by
"Working Groups" composed of non-Board members. Board meetings
were not open to the public. The process for the exposure of drafts was not
formalized.63
58 Id.
59 IASC-US COMPARISON, supra note 9, at 44.60 Id. at 43.
61 International Accounting Standards Committee Constitution (Oct. 1992) 7 (on file
with Professor Ruder) [hereinafter IASC Constitution].
62 See IASC-US COMPARISON, supra note 9, at 44. This was a concern of the Strategy
Working Party in the December 1998 SWP Paper. The Strategy Working Party believed that
"the process for appointments to the IASC Board and key IASC committees should be the
responsibility of a variety of constituencies, while ensuring that those appointed are
competent, independent and objective." December 1998 SWP Paper, supra note 55, at
Executive Summary, p. 10.
63 See IASC-US COMPARISON, supra note 9, at 101-05 (comparing IASC due process and
FASB due process for exposure drafts and noting that the IASC had no minimum comment
period, but rather a period that was "generally six months or longer").
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3. The "Core Standards" Project
In the 1990s, the IASC shifted its focus from being an international
body with the goal of harmonizing accounting standards throughout the
world to the goal of being the primary international accounting standard
setter. The shift in focus was illustrated by its "core standards" project. In
1995, the International Organization of Securities Commissions developed
a work plan with the IASC for completion of a set of core standards that
would facilitate a single disclosure document for cross-border offerings and
listings.64 The IASC completed the last of the core standards in December
1998 .65
4. The SEC View of Cross Border Filing
The core standards project became important to the Securities and
Exchange Commission because it raised the question of whether foreign
issuers would be able to use IASC standards without reconciliation or
partial reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.66 In April 1996, the SEC issued a
press release specifying three key elements that would be necessary for the
SEC's acceptance of IASC Standards:
1. The standards should include a core set of accounting
pronouncements that constitute a comprehensive, generally accepted
basis of accounting.
2. The standards must be of high quality-they must result in
comparability and transparency, and they must provide for full
disclosure.
3. The standards must be rigorously interpreted and applied.
67
In 1996, the U.S. Congress expressed interest in the establishment of a
"high-quality comprehensive set of generally accepted international
accounting standards" that would facilitate international financial activities.
In the National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Congress
requested that the SEC report by October 1997 on the progress of the
completion of a set of international accounting standards that would be
64 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on Promoting Global Preeminence of
American Securities Markets at II.A, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
acctgsp.htm (Oct. 1997) [hereinafter SEC Report].
65 See Deloitte, Chronology of IASB and IASC, available at http://www.iasplus.com/
restruct/chrono.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
66 IASC-US COMPARISON 2ND ED., supra note 9, at 4. See discussion of reconciliation
requirements, supra note 5.
67 Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Statement Regarding
International Accounting Standards (Apr. 11, 1996), in SEC Report, supra note 64, at app. 5,
Issue 96-61.
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acceptable for cross-border offerings. 68  In its October 1997 report to
Congress, the SEC's response expressed uncertainty regarding use of IASC
standards and stated that "at this point, it is not clear what the
Commission's final decision regarding the core standards project will be."69
The problems raised by acceptance of IASC standards were set forth in
1999 by the staff of the FASB, as follows:
If IASC standards were used by foreign issuers without reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP, how different would financial reporting in the United
States be from that presently required in U.S. capital markets? Would
the information provided by IASC standards be higher or lower in
quality, more or less extensive, or substantially similar to what investors
currently receive and understand?
If IASC standards were accepted without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP
for foreign registrants, how would financial reporting by U.S.
companies be impacted? Permitting foreign issuers to use IASC
standards without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP would increase
noncomparability in U.S. capital markets. Is it acceptable for the
accounting requirements for foreign registrants and domestic registrants
to differ? Would there be pressure on the SEC to accept IASC standards
for domestic registrants?
70
In February of 2000, the SEC announced its plans to undertake an
evaluation of IASC standards, stating that it was seeking "input to
determine under what conditions we should accept financial statements of
foreign private issuers that are prepared using the standards promulgated by
the International Accounting Standards Committee.'
C. The IASC's Restructuring
In 1998, the IASC recognized that its standard setting process needed
68 H.R. 3005, 104th Cong. §509(3) (1996). U.S. stock exchanges stand to profit from
additional foreign securities listings. They have argued that U.S. disclosure requirements are
a major barrier to foreign securities listings and impede the growth of U.S. exchanges. See
JAMES L COCHRAN, FOREIGN EQUITIES AND U.S. INVESTORS: BREAKING DowN THE BARRIERS
SEPARATING SUPPLY AND DEMAND (New York Stock Exchange Working Paper No. 95-04,
1995); IASC-US COMPARISON 2ND ED., supra note 9, at 17. The argument is that cross
border listings will move away unless the SEC eases cross border filings by accepting IASC
standards. "Advocates of IASC standards argue that U.S. filing requirements are a major
impediment to foreign securities listings in the United States and, thus, requiring use of
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for foreign issuers impedes the growth of U.S. stock
exchanges." Id.
69 SEC Report, supra note 64, at Executive Summary.
70 IASC-US COMPARISON 2ND ED., supra note 9, at 5.
71 SEC Concept Release on IAS, supra note 4.
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to be improved if its standards were to be accepted worldwide, particularly
in the United States. It formed the Strategy Working Party (SWP) to
evaluate the IASC's structure, invite comments, and propose an improved
structure. In December of 1998, the SWP issued a Discussion Paper,
"Shaping IASC for the Future" (December 1998 SWP Paper), which
proposed a plan to restructure the IASC and converge national accounting
standards and practices into high quality global accounting standards.72 In
November of 1999, it issued "Recommendations on Shaping IASC for the
Future" (November 1999 SWP Paper) to the IASC Board. The reports,
comments, and discussion that followed these two papers presented two
different views, a standard setting approach based on independence and a
standard setting approach based on representativeness.
1. The SWP December 1998 Paper - A Bicameral Structure
The December 1998 SWP Paper proposed that the IASC be organized
using a bicameral structure composed of an independent Standards
Development Committee charged with drafting standards and a
representative IASC Standards Board given power of final approval over
standards.
Under the bicameral structure proposed in the December 1998 SWP
Paper, the major work for setting IASC standards would be accomplished
by an eleven member Standards Developmeni Committee (SDC), composed
primarily of committee members from various national standard setters,
with the remaining members chosen from other groups such as preparers
and users of financial statements, public accountants, academics, and
regulators.74 The December 1998 SWP Paper proposed a partnership
between national standard setters and the IASC in order to accelerate
convergence between national standards and IASC standards. 75 It also
recognized that acceptance of IASC standards as national standards would
take place on a country by country basis, preserving sovereignty for each
participating nation.76
Under the proposal, the SDC would have had responsibility for
drafting the IASC standards. It would prepare exposure drafts and final
drafts of international accounting standards in coordination with standard
setters of the various countries.77
72 December 1998 SWP Paper, supra note 55.
73 International Accounting Standards Committee, Recommendations on Shaping IASC
for the Future (November 1999), available at http://www.iasb.org/uploadedfiles/
documents/8_210_swp-rep.pdf [hereinafter November 1999 SWP Paper].
74 December 1998 SWP Paper, supra note 55, 126.
71 Id. T 216.
76 Id. T 216-18.
71 Id. 154-59
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Regarding the make-up of the SDC, the SWP proposed that at least
seven of its eleven members be from more developed countries and at least
two be from emerging market economies.78 The SWP proposed that special
consideration be given to countries likely to make extensive use of IASC
standards, or that have a high proportion of foreign trade or enterprises with
foreign operations. It proposed a reasonable geographical spread of SDC
members."
As a key element in preserving representativeness, the December 1998
SWP Paper proposed a broad-based IASC Standards Board that would
approve SDC generated IASC standards. The proposal was for a twenty-
five member Board with twenty country seats for professional accountancy
bodies, and five seats for organizations with an interest in financial
reporting.8° Regarding the makeup of the Standards Board, the SWP
proposed that there be a reasonable geographic spread of Board members. 81
2. Trustee Oversight
The SWP proposed that oversight of the standard setting process be
placed in a Board of Trustees made up of twelve Trustees. 82 Six Trustees
would be appointed by various organizations, such as the International
Federation of Accountants.83 A Nominating Committee composed of
former IASC and IFAC officials would appoint six other at large
members.84 The SWP believed that most of the Trustees should be from
developed countries, but found it desirable to have some from emerging
market economies, with special consideration given for countries likely to
make use of IASC standards or with a high proportion of foreign trade or
enterprises with foreign operations.85 The SWP Report provided that there
should be a reasonable geographic diversity of Trustees and a diversity of
backgrounds, including Trustees with experience in senior positions as
users and preparers of financial reports, public accountants, academics,
regulators and others who could make active contributions.86
3. Improved Due Process
The SWP recognized that better due process in the deliberations of the






84 December 1998 SWP Paper, supra note 55, T 149(b).
85 Id. N$ 150(c)-(d).
86 Id. $T 150(e)-(g).
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SDC and the Standards Board would increase the quality and acceptability
of IASC standards.87 Improved due process would involve increased open
meetings of the SDC, Standards Board, and Trustees; 88 advanced
publications of the agendas for meetings of the SDC, Board and Trustees;
89
publication of a Basis for Conclusions;90 optional public hearings and field
tests for all projects; 91 and publication of Exposure Drafts and other
documents for public comment.
92
4. Reaction to the SWP Proposal
The IASC received more than eighty-five letters of comment to the
December 1998 SWP Paper. Major opposing positions related to the role of
the IASC Standards Board. Regarding the legitimacy of the standard
setting body, comments referred mostly to two attributes: (1)
representativeness of the decision making body; and (2) independence of its
members.93 The most controversial recommendation made by the SWP was
that the Standards Board have the final power to approve IASC standards.
The Invitation to Comment portion of the draft indicated that some
members of the SWP preferred that final approval power should rest with
the SDC.9 4
Most letters supported the reorganization project in principle.
Widespread support was expressed for the improvements in due process.95
The European Commission and many other European observers advocated
control over standard setting by a geographically diverse, large Standards
Board. Their view of "representativeness" was that legitimacy should come
through approval by a relatively large and geographically diverse group of
carefully selected and informed persons.
U.S. observers did not support the structure set forth in the December
1998 Paper because the structure did not adequately insure the IASC's
87 See generally id. 203-04.
88 Id. 204(a).
89 Id. 204(c).
90 December 1998 SWP Paper, supra note 55, 204(d).
9' Id. 205(a)-(b).
92 Id. 206(d).
93 See, e.g., Comment Letter from the European Commission to Sir Bryan Carsberg (Apr.
28, 1999) (on file with Professor Ruder) (advocating representantiveness); Comment Letter
from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to Sir Bryan Carsberg (May 14, 1999)
(on file with Professor Ruder) (advocating independence).
94 See December 1998 SWP Paper, supra note 55, Invitation to Comment, Question 4.
95 See, e.g., Comment Letter from the European Commission, supra note 93; Letter from
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 93. Additional comment letters
responding to the 1998 paper's Invitation to Comment are on file with Professor Ruder.
96 Comment Letter from the European Commission, supra note 93.
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independence.97 Based in part on the past failings of the CAP and the APB,
the FASB, the AICPA, and the SEC advocated a small, highly qualified
independent Board and opposed control by a "representative group." The
FASB stated that the SDC "should be an autonomous and independent
decision making body." 98 The AICPA stated that its vision "contemplates
an independent standard setting board, not directly associated with any
professional organization, country or national standard setter." 99 The SEC
agreed.100
5. The Compromise
In November 1999, the SWP adopted a compromise position in
"Recommendations on Shaping IASC for the Future" made to the IASC
Board.' O1  The November 1999 SWP Paper emerged after extensive
negotiations and conversations between IASC Board members, members of
the accounting profession, securities regulators, and the other regulatory
authorities. The debate was resolved in favor of the independent board
model, with geographic representation at the Trustee level. On March 17,
2000, the IASC Board unanimously approved a new Constitution for the
restructured IASC based on the November 1999 SWP Paper. 10 2 The new
Constitution was approved by the members of the IASC on May 24, 2000
and became effective on that date. 0 3 The stated objectives of the newly
constituted IASCF were to develop a "single set of high quality,
understandable and enforceable global accounting standards" and "to bring
about convergence" of national and international accounting standards to
"high quality solutions." 104 The convergence objective was thus clearly set
forth in the Constitution.
97 See, e.g., Comment Letter from the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the
Financial Accounting Foundation to Sir Bryan Carsberg 2 (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with
Professor Ruder). The FASB disagreed with a bicameral system because SDC proposals
would be subject to Board approval. Id. at 17.
" Id. at 17.
99 Comment Letter from the AICPA to Sir Bryan Carsberg, IASC 3 (Apr. 21, 1999) (on
file with Professor Ruder).
100 See Comment Letters, supra note 93.
101 November 1999 SWP Paper, supra note 76.
102 Press Release, International Accounting Standards Committee, Shaping IASC for the
Future: IASC Board Approves New Constitution (Mar. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.iasb.org/docs/press/2000pr07.pdf.
103 Press Release, International Accounting Standards Committee, Shaping IASC for the
Future: IASC Members Approve Restructuring (May 24, 2000), available at http://
http://www.iasb.org/docs/press/2000pr16.pdf.
104 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7, 2(a).
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D. The New Structure of the IASCF
In the new structure, the IASCF was established as an independent
organization with:
1. oversight by a representative IASCF Board of Trustees;
2. standard setting by an independent International Accounting
Standards Board;
3. interpretations and advice by the International Financial Reporting
Interpretations Committee (IFRIC); and
4. advice by the Standards Advisory Council (SAC).
10 5
1. IASCF Board of Trustees
The Constitution of the IASCF places governance responsibility in a
Board of Trustees of the Foundation. The governance pattern is not
designed to provide geographical balance in the Trustees, but to preserve
the ability of an independent FASB to set accounting standards. The
Trustees are given power to appoint the members of the IASB, IFRIC and
SAC, 106 to review board strategic issues affecting accounting standards, and
to establish "operating procedures" for IASB, IFRIC and SAC. However,
the Trustees are excluded from involvement in technical issues relating to
accounting standards. 1
0 7
2. Geographical Distribution and Qualification for Trustees
The composition of the Foundation Board of Trustees reflects the
compromise between independence and representativness recommended by
the SWP. Although the IASB is composed of independent members, the
Trustees are representatives of the world's capital markets. The
Constitution provides that the "Trustees shall comprise nineteen
individuals"'0 8 and that "the mix of Trustees shall be representative of the
world's capital markets and a diversity of geographical and professional
backgrounds."' 09 The Constitution states that:
In order to ensure a broad international basis, there shall be:
Six Trustees appointed from North America
Six Trustees appointed from Europe
105 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7; see also Press Release, International Accounting
Standards Committee, IASC Board Reaches Momentous Decision on Its Future Structure
(Nov. 19, 1999), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/press/99prl 119.pdf.
106 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7, 16(a)-(b).
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Four Trustees appointed from the Asia/Pacific Region; and
Three Trustees appointed from any area, subject to establishing
geographic balance.
Concern regarding Trustee geographic balance was further expressed
in a paragraph requiring a constitutional review to be completed five years
after adoption of the Constitution, as follows: "such review to include
consideration of changing the geographical distribution of Trustees in
response to changing global economic conditions."' 11'
3. Appointment of the Trustees
In December 1999, even before the new structure was approved, the
IASC Board appointed a high level seven-person Nominating Committee to
select the Board of Trustees to govern the restructured IASC. 12 Members
of the Committee included the chairs of the securities regulatory bodies of
France, Germany, Hong Kong, and the United States, the deputy chairman
of the German accounting standards board, and the President of the World
Bank. 113 SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt was chosen by the Nominating
Committee members to chair the Committee." 4
The Nominating Committee was charged with appointing nineteen
Trustees to oversee the new IASC standards board. It was successful in
recruiting Trustees of prominence l 5 and persuaded Paul Volcker, former
110 Id.
111 Id. 18(b).
112 Press Release, International Accounting Standards Committee, Shaping IASC for the
Future: Board Takes First Step in Implementing Proposed Structure - Nominating
Committee Approved (Dec. 17, 1999), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/
press/99pr1217.pdf [hereinafter Nominating Committee Press Release].
113 Id. The members were: Dr. Karl H. Buamann, Chairman of the Supervisory Board,
Siemens AG, Deputy Chairman DRSC (the German national accounting standards setter);
Mr. James E. Copeland, Jr., Chief Executive Officer, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu; Mr.
Howard Davies, Chairman, UK Financial Services Authority; Mr. Arthur Levitt, Jr.,
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; M. Michel Prada, Chairman, French
Commission des Operations de Bourse; Mr. Andrew Sheng, Chairman, Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission; and Mr. James D. Wolfensohn, President, The World
Bank.
114 International Accounting Standards Board, Restructuring IASC (1997-2001),
available at http://www.iasb.org/about/history_restructure.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
115 On May 22, 2000 the IASC Nominating Committee announced the selection of the
initial nineteen Trustees of the restructured IASC, including the Chairman. They were
selected in accordance with the geographical standards required by Section 6 of the
Constitution, as follows:
North America (6): The Hon Paul A Volcker, Chairman, Former Chairman, U.S. Federal
Reserve Board; John H Biggs, Chairman, TIAA-CREF; L Yves Fortier, Chairman, Ogilvy
Renault, Barristers and Solicitors; Former Ambassador of Canada to the United Nations;
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Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Board, to serve as Chairman
of the Board of Trustees. 
1 6
4. hternational Accounting Standards Board
a. IASB - Establishment and Powers
The new Constitution established the International Accounting
Standards Board, with "responsibility for all IASB technical matters
including the preparation and issuing of International Accounting
Standards,""l7 thus indicating the Board's independence. It also added that
the Board would "have full discretion over the technical agenda of the
IASB and over project assignments on technical matters.""
8
b. IASB - Combining Skills and Independence
The IASB is comprised of fourteen members, two of whom are part-time." 19
Although foremost qualification for membership of the IASB is "technical
expertise,"' 12  other criteria also apply. The Trustees are charged with
Philip A Laskawy, Chairman, Ernst & Young International; David S Ruder, Professor of
Law, Northwestern University School of Law and Former Chairman, U.S. Securities &
Exchange Commission; William C Steere, Jr., Chairman and CEO, Pfizer Inc.
Europe (6): Guido A Ferrarini, Professor of Law, University of Genoa; Cornelius
Herkstrdter, Former President, Royal Dutch Petroleum; Hilmar Kopper, Chairman of the
Supervisory Board, Deutsche Bank; Sir Sydney Lipworth, Chairman, UK Financial
Reporting Council; Didier Pineau-Valencienne, Chairman, Association Fran~aise des
Entreprises Privres; Jens Roder, Senior Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Denmark
Asia-Pacific (4): Toshikatsu Fukuma, Chief Financial Officer, Mitsui & Co., Ltd.; Charles
Yeh Kwong Lee, Chairman, Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Ltd.; Kenneth H Spencer,
Former Chairman, Australian Accounting Standards Board; company director; Koji Tajika,
Co-Chairman, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu;
Other (3): Roy Andersen, Deputy Chairman and CEO, The Liberty Life Group (South
Africa); Andrew Crockett, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements; Roberto
Teixeira da Costa, Former Chairman, Brazilian Comissfio de Valores Mobiliirios.
Press Release, International Accounting Standards Committee, Shaping IASC for the Future:
IASC Nominating Committee Selects Initial Trustees of Restructured IASC (May 22, 2000),
available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/press/2000prl5.pdf [hereinafter Initial Trustees Press
Release].
116 Id.
"7 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7, 32(a).
"8 Id. 32(c).
... See id. 19.
120 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7, 20.
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selecting a group of people representing "the best available combination of
technical skills and background experiences of relevant international
business and market conditions."' 21 The latter clause was added so that
some of the board members would have practical experience in applying
accounting principles. To further the objectives of assuring broad
backgrounds, the Constitution requires that there be minimum numbers of
members with the following backgrounds: three practicing auditors; three
preparers of financial statements; three users of financial statements; and
one academic. No background was specified for the other four Board
members.1
22
Independence was emphasized in the provisions stating that "[t]he
foremost qualification for membership shall be technical expertise,"'123 and
that "[t]he selection of members of the IASB shall not be based on
geographic representation. The Trustees shall ensure that the IASB is not
dominated by any particular constituency or geographical interest."'
' 24
The Constitution accepted the SWP theory that IASB standards should
be promulgated in cooperation with the standard setters of various
countries. In order to facilitate that cooperation and to help achieve
convergence, the Constitution specifies that "seven of the full-time
members of the IASB will be expected to have formed liaison
responsibilities with national standard-setters in order to promote"
convergence. 1
25
IASB cooperation with the standard setters of the various countries is
the core of the plan for successful convergence of accounting standards.
Although the IASB's International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)
will not in most cases be binding on national standard setters, the theory of
establishing liaison relationships is that national standard setters and the
IASB will adopt nearly identical standards at the same time. The plan is
that standard setting agendas will be coordinated, draft standards proposals
will be similar, and the national standard setters will provide expertise and
staff to assist in IASB projects.
c. Board Appointments
Sir David Tweedie, formerly Chairman of the United Kingdom's
Accounting Standards Board (ASB), was selected to chair the new Board
on January 28, 2000. Sir David was a well-respected representative to the
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ASB, had a fine record as administrator of the ASB, and had been an active
member of the Strategy Working Party. His unanimous selection by the
Trustees provided a vigorous start for the administration of the IASB.
Following Sir David's appointment, the Trustees advertised for IASB
Board positions, considered more than 200 applicants, and chose the
fourteen Board members. The requirements that there be three auditors,
three preparers, three users, and one academic posed difficult selection
problems for the Trustees because the well qualified candidates did not fit
neatly into required categories.
126
5. The International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee
The Constitution also established an International Financial Reporting
Interpretations Committee (IFRIC), modeled after the Emerging Issues
Task Force of the FASB. 127 IFRIC's role is to interpret the application of
IFRSs and to provide timely guidance on financial reporting issues not
otherwise addressed. 28 It is required to report its final interpretations to the
IASB and obtain its approval.
2
Selection of IFRIC members is not subject to constitutional provisions
requiring either independence or full-time service, prohibiting geographical
representation, or requiring a balance of auditors, preparers, users, or
academics. However, the Constitution does impose independence standards
by requiring that IFRIC members "vote in accordance with their own
independent views not as representatives voting according to the views of
any firm, organization or constituency with which they may be
associated.'
130
IFRIC is currently composed of eleven members, including six audit
firm partners, two preparers, two analysts, and two academics. The
European Commission and IOSCO are observers.'
3'
126 In their Constitution Review, the Trustees' Constitution Committee proposed to relax
these requirements, stating that "the present system (when combined with liaison
requirements) may be unduly restrictive and may inhibit the recruitment of qualified
candidates." International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Review of the
Constitution: Proposals for change (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.iasb.org/
uploadedfiles/documents/8 949 2004-cons-itc.pdf, 80, 97, 98 [hereinafter Proposals for
Change]. See also Part III.E.5, infra.
127 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7, 34. IFRIC was established in its current form
following a revision of the Constitution effective March 2, 2002. The Constitution was also
revised by the Trustees on July 8, 2002 to reflect changes considered to be minor variations
pertinent to paragraph 15 of the Constitution.
128 Id. 37 (a).
129 Id. 37 (d).
130 Id. 36.
131 International Accounting Standards Board, IFRIC Members, available at
http://www.iasb.org/about/ifricmembers.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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6. The Standards Advisory Council
Geographical diversity at the advisory level was established by
creating a Standards Advisory Council (SAC) that:
provides a forum for participation of organizations and individuals with
an interest in international financial reporting, having diverse
geographical and functional backgrounds, with the objective of (a)
giving advice to the IASB on agenda decisions and priorities in the
IASB's work, (b) informing the IASB of the views of organizations and
individuals of the Council on major standard-setting projects and (c)
giving other advice to the IASB or the Trustees.
132
Members of the SAC are appointed by the Trustees and are expected
to provide the IASB with practical advice regarding the impact of proposed
standards on business operations. Although the Constitution states that the
"Council shall comprise 30 or more members,"1 33 the interest in service on
the SAC was so large that when establishing the Council the Trustees chose
50 persons to serve as members of the Council.
34
7. IASB Voting
The voting process at a standard setter can affect outcome. The
IASCF Constitution requires that IFRSs and IFRIC interpretations be
approved by eight of the fourteen members of the IASB, but requires
approval only by a majority of the members present at a meeting for other
matters. 1
35
8. IASB Due Process
In answer to criticisms that IASC standard setting was not sufficiently
open, the SWP recommendations for IASB due process were included in
the Constitution. The Constitution contains requirements that the IASB
publish exposure drafts on all projects, 136 establish procedures for reviewing
comments, 137 and consult the Standards Advisory Council on major
132 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7, 38.
133 Id. 39.
134 Press Release, International Accounting Standards Board, Trustees Name Standards
Interpretation Committee (Dec. 13, 2001).
131 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7, 31. On the other matters, including publication of
drafts, a simple majority of the members present at a meeting is required, provided that the
meeting is attended by at least 60% of IASB members. Id. The Chairman is given a casting
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projects, agenda decisions, and work papers. 138  On other due process
matters the IASB is given discretion. It is advised "normally" to form
Steering Committees or other advisory groups 139 and to issue "bases for
conclusions."' 140  It is advised to "consider" holding hearings14 ' and
undertaking field tests. 1
42
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
A. Procedures for Review
The Trustees have the power to amend the Constitution 143 by a 75%
majority vote. 144 They are required to review the entire structure of the
IASC Foundation and its effectiveness with the objective of implementing
any agreed changes five years after the coming into force of the
Constitution.4 4 They are required to undertake "a similar review
subsequently every five years."
14
As required by the IASC Constitution, 147 the Trustees initiated a
"Constitution Review" in November of 2003 with the objective of
implementing changes by February 6, 2006, five years after the
incorporation of the IASC Foundation. 148  The Trustees formed a
Constitution Committee, which has published consultation papers, held
hearings, received comments, and made recommendations to the Trustees.
After discussing the recommendations from the Constitution Committee,
the Trustees published a final consultation paper. The papers published by
the Constitution Committee and the Trustees are:
1. IASCF Constitution Committee, Identifying Issues for the IASC
138 Id. 32(d)(iii).
"' Id. 32(d)(ii).




144 A 75% majority of Trustees is required for amendments to the Constitution. Id.
Amendments to the Constitution require a due process, including consultation with the
Standards Advisory Council and Publication of an exposure draft for public comment. Id.
16(g).
14 IASCF Constitution, supra note 7, 18(b).
146 Id. 18(c).
147 Id. 18(b).
148 Press Release, International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Trustees
Announce the Process for Constitutional Review (Nov. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.iasb.org/uploadedfiles/documents/8_887_IASCFReviewProcess.doc.
[hereinafter Process for Constitutional Review]. The following discussion of the Constitution
Review process was current as of this Article's publication date of April 6, 2005.
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Foundation Constitution Review, an Invitation to Comment, November
2003.149
2. IASF Constitution Committee, Next Steps for the Constitution
Review Following Initial Consultations, March 22, 2004.150
3. IASCF Constitution Committee, An Update on the Constitution Review
and Information Regarding Public Hearings, May 7, 2004.151
4. IASCF Constitution Committee, An Update on Constitutuion Review for
Hearing in Mexico City, September 28, 2004.152
5. IASCF, Preliminary Recommendation by the Constitution
Committee to the IASCF Trustee for Consideration at the October
25 Trustees Meeting, revised October 20, 2004.153
6. IASCF, Review of the Constitution: Proposals for Change,
November 2004.154
The Constitution review process has raised a number of issues that
relate to the IASB's independence, and ultimately to the success of the
convergence process. The issues were discussed in the various consultation
papers, in responses to those papers, and in testimony at various hearings.
B. Issues for consideration
In their November 2004 paper, Proposals for Change, the Trustees
made proposals in various areas, most of them affecting independence and
convergence.155 The Trustees identified ten issues for consideration:
149 International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Identifying Issues for the
IASC Foundation Constitution Review (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/
2003-itc/2003-con-itc.pdf [hereinafter Identifying Issues].
150 International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Next Steps for the
Constitution Review Following Initial Consultation (Mar. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/uploaded files/documents/8_887_ConstitutionReviewNextSteps.pdf.
151 International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, An Update on the
Constitution Review and Information Regarding Public Hearings (May 7, 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/uploaded-files/documents/8_860-anUpdateontheConstitutionReview.
pdf.
152 International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, An Update on
Constitution Review for Hearing in Mexico City (Sept. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/uploaded files/documents/8_887_UpdateforMexico280904.pdf.
153 International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Preliminary
Recommendation by the Constitution Committee to the IASCF Trustee for Consideration at
the October 25 Trustees Meeting (rev. Oct. 20, 2004), available at http://www.iasb.org/
uploadedfiles/documents/latestupdate 21_1004.pdf [hereinafter Preliminary Constitution
Committee Recommendation].
154 Proposals for Change, supra note 126.
155 Id.
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1. Whether the objectives of the IASC Foundation should expressly refer to
the challenges facing small and medium-sized entities (SMEs).
2. Number of Trustees and their geographical and professional distribution.
3. The oversight role of the Trustees.
4. Funding of the IASC Foundation.
5. The composition of the IASB.
6. The appropriateness of the IASB's existing formal liaison relationships.
7. Consultative arrangements of the IASB.
8. Voting procedures of the IASB.
9. Resources and effectiveness of the International Financial Reporting
Interpretations Committee.
10.The composition, role, and effectiveness of the Standards Advisory
Council. 156
The Trustees' proposals regarding each of these topics were made after
receiving comments from various interested parties, including companies,
standard setters, professional organizations, and other entities. The
comments reflected diverse views regarding the importance of having an
independent IASB Board.
C. Responses Advocating Decreases in IASB Independence
Some of the responders advocated changes that would reduce the
IASB's independence from the influence of business and political interests.
1. Increased Representation from Countries Using IFRSs
A number of responders told the Committee that membership selection
for either the IASCF Trustees, or the Board members, or both, should favor
candidates from countries already using IFRSs. The European Financial
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) opined that "the IASB will have
greater credibility if trustees and members of the Board come
predominantly from countries using IFRSs."' 57 Taking this idea a step
further, BNP Paribas explained why such a change would improve the
IASB's credibility: "[T]he legitimacy of international accounting standards
implies that they be prepared and approved by countries that have adopted
IFRSs."158  This was a popular position among European agencies,
organizations and corporations, 59 some of whom stated that the IASB was
156 Id. at 12-41.
157 Comment letter from EFRAG to Tom Seidenstein 2 (Feb. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/c164.pdf.
158 Comment letter from BNP Paribas to Tom Seidenstein 1 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/c166.pdf.
159 Responders recommending that Trustee or Board membership favor IFRS-applying
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dominated by members from countries with "legalistic"'1 60 accounting-
regulation traditions.
1 61
2. Greater Trustee Oversight
Many responders argued that the Trustees should regularly "review"
the Board's strategy and procedures. BNP Paribas recommended "the
board of [T]rustees review regularly the strategy as well as the agenda
which can't be separated from the strategy, and the operating procedures of
the IASB."' 162 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision cited "a need
for more active ongoing oversight of the IASB than that currently provided
by the Trustees" in order to improve the IASB's "accountability."
1 63
3. Greater Due Process
A large number of responses to the Trustees' due process question
reflected dissatisfaction with the IASB's processes of exposure, comment,
and deliberation when drafting standards. A number of responders seemed
to be faulting the IASB's due process for failing to produce results to their
liking. For instance, Banque de France said:
The use of public comments by IASB could also be improved. In
several cases, it was noted that the IASB did not change its mind
although convergent comments criticized some proposals in a draft
standard. We think it is necessary to clarify such kind of situation and
give a more detailed feedback on comment letters received. The
Constitution provisions related to due process should also determine
how binding public consultations could be, when there is a consensus
countries included EFRAG, RSM Robson Rhodes LLP, BNP Paribas, Banque de France,
Deutscher Standardisienmgsrat (arguing that "the criterion of experience in applying IFRS"
should be used to select Trustees), Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes
("CNCC"), the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, Ernst & Young Global
Limited, the European Commission ("The real question is who are the constituents of the
IASC Foundation and the IASB?... In the composition of the Board of Trustees, clear
weighting should be given to those countries that apply IAS"). For all comment letters, see
International Accounting Standards Foundation, IASC Foundation Projects: Comment letters
received in first round of consultation (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/current/iascfcomment.asp?showPageContent-=no&xml=16_96_88_230
82004.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
160 Comment Letter from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to Tom Seidenstein 2
(Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/c133.pdf.
161 See Comment Letter from Banque de France to Tom Seidenstein 1 1.2 (Feb. 23,
2004), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/c168.pdf.
162 Comment Letter from BNP Paribas, supra note 158, at 3.
163 Comment Letter from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 160, at 2.
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against a proposal of the IASB
64
Other critics recommended that the IASB's due process be redirected
toward considering the "implementability' ' 165  and "macroeconomic
effects"' 166 of accounting standards.
Many of the critics of IASB independence seemed to be concerned
with the effect of IASB standards on business interests. Some
organizations and companies seemed to consider the short-term economic
effects of accounting standards to be more important than the benefits
derived from transparency and comparability. For example, the February
2004 comment letter of UNICE, the European organization of employers,
complained that "many of the standards adopted are too burdensome for
business to comply with.., an excessive emphasis is being placed on abuse
prevention." 67
4. 1ASB Independence
Opposition to IASB independence was revealed in several ways. BNP
Paribas argued that the Trustees should give banks more power as part of
the "analyst and investment community":1
68
Banks lend money to companies on the basis of their financial
statements and insurance companies invest heavily in financial markets.
They belong to the users' community and should be involved in the
standard-setting process as such. 1
69
Some responders advocated requiring supermajority votes of the Board
to pass standards 170 and increasing the number of part-time Board
164 Comment Letter from Banque de France, supra note 161, 1.3.
165 Comment Letter from BNP Paribas, supra note 158, at 2.
166 id.
167 Comment Letter from UNICE to Tom Seidenstein 2 (Feb. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/docs/ 2003-itc/c125.pdf.
168 Identifying Issues, supra note 149, at 9.
169 Id. Comment Letter from BNP Paribas, supra note 158, at 4. Investors reap the
benefits of high quality standards, so they might be expected to support the same reforms
that politically powerful economic interests tend to oppose. Despite the expectation, the
Constitution Committee admitted that the IASCF "has experienced difficulty" in involving
investors in standard setting. Identifying Issues, supra note 149, at 9. Part of the answer to
the question of why investors seem much less interested in supporting high quality
accounting standards than economic interests are in opposing them perhaps can be found by
analyzing the magnitude of impacts. Each improvement in accounting standards benefits an
individual investor only marginally but it may require wrenching changes for a large
reporting corporation.
170 See, e.g., Comment Letter from Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens to
Tom Seidenstein 3 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/cl40.pdf:
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members. 171  Both changes might diminish the Board's independence, or
the meaningfulness thereof-the former by simply making the passage of
standards more difficult and the latter by increasing the odds of having
Board members still employed by, or beholden to, economic interests.
D. Responses Advocating Independence
Proponents of the IASB's independence also responded to the paper.
One proponent, the United Kingdom's Accounting Standards Board (ASB),
advocated widely-based selection of Trustees and Board members: "It is...
important not only that dominance by any one constituency or group should
be avoided but also that it should be widely perceived to have been
avoided. 172  The Committee of European Securities Regulators affirmed
that any reform must protect the IASB's independence and that "[t]he needs
of investors should be paramount." Its discussion of due process issues was
oriented towards process, rather than result. 
173
Given the wide implications of new or amended standards and IASB's public interest role
and in order to ensure a strong consensus on the Board in respect of new exposure drafts and
standards of the highest quality, it is advisable to change these voting rules to qualified
majority by requiring approval by ten out of fourteen members.
171 See, e.g., Comment Letter from Ernst & Young to Tom Seidenstein 5 (Feb. 11, 2004),
available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/c123.pdf:
A Board that is made up exclusively of professional standard setters is likely to be less
accountable to those for whom it is preparing standards than a board that includes members
with current or very recent experience as preparers and users.., they will inevitably tend to
promote conceptual purity above practicality .... In our view, a largely part-time board
would bring the necessary practical experience to bear and would therefore be better placed
than a largely full-time board to address these issues.
172 Comment Letter from Accounting Standards Board to Tom Seidenstein 1 9 (Feb. 12,
2004), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/c127.pdf. See also Comment Letter
from Accounting Standards Board (Canada) to Paul Volcker 2 (Feb. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/cII6.pdf ("Independence of the standard-setting process
and highest quality of standards must be non-negotiable."); Comment Letter from Deloitte
Touche Tomatsu to Tom Seidenstein 2 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-it/cl21.pdf ("[T]he trustees should [ensure] ... that Board
members are not denominated by any individual characteristic.")
173 Comment Letter from Committee of European Securities Regulators to Tom
Seidenstein 3 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/2003-itc/c137.pdf.
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E. The Trustees' Proposals
1. General Support of Independence
After receiving the Constitution Committee's October 25, 2004174
recommendations, the Trustees endorsed a set of final proposals in their
paper, "Review of the Constitution: Proposals for Change," on November
23, 2004.175 In their proposals, the Trustees responded to many of the
proposals for change and emphasized their support for the independence of
the IASB. The Trustees' statement on the "Philosophy of the Constitution
Review" expressed clear support for an independent IASB as follows:
The Constitution approved by the former IASC in 2000 established a
new structure that recognized the need both to assure the quality of the
standards and the accountability of the standard-setting process to the
public, which the organization serves. The result is a carefully
conceived process, whereby the technical and frequently difficult and
controversial decisions in setting accounting standards are the
responsibility of an independent expert group with diverse practical and
professional backgrounds. The process is overseen by a broadly
representative Trustee body. While not opining on technical accounting
decisions, the Trustees ensure that decisions of the IASB are taken with
due care, only after appropriate and extensive consultation, and using
the IASB 's best professional judgment. The purpose of this system is to
protect the integrity of the standard-setting process from vested
interests, political and parochial pressures, and purely national
considerations.1
76
The Trustees prefaced their proposals for change by emphasizing that
they would "continue to protect the independence of the IASC Foundation
and the IASB" while ensuring "that the organisation remains responsive to
the requirements of the marketplace and the many parties that seek a voice
in the development of broadly accepted, high quality international
accounting standards. ' , 17 ' They reaffirmed the organization's basic
dichotomy: the Trustees are "widely representative," while the IASB is
"independent.'
78
174 Preliminary Constitution Committee Recommendation, supra note 153.
175 Proposals for Change, supra note 126. A three-month comment period on Proposals
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2. Number of Trustees and Distribution
Regarding the issue of "Trustee selection and geographic and
professional distribution" the Trustees rejected proposals that special
recognition be given to countries that have adopted IFRSs. Instead, they
recognized that other areas of the world should be encouraged to adopt
IFRSs. They proposed increasing the number of Trustees to twenty-two
from nineteen, and adding two new Trustees from Asia/Oceania and one
new Trustee from any area.17 9 The Trustees also proposed increasing the
size of the board to twenty-two'80 in recognition "that some large
economies outside Europe and North American may be under represented
or not represented at all. , 18 ' After noting that the organization's objectives
"call for the organisation to work 'in the public interest' towards 'global
accounting standards' through a process of 'convergence of national
accounting standards' and IFRSs,"' they stated that:
Weighting a particular region because of its current position on IFRSs
might impede the objective of developing global standards. First,
reducing the relative representation of an area because it has not adopted
IFRSs at present might reduce the incentive for it to participate in
convergence. Second, to emphasise particular areas that are using
IFRSs might focus the IASC Foundation and the IASB on regional or
national concerns at the expense of the organisation's broader
international objectives ....
The Trustees also endorsed changes regarding the background of
Trustees by relaxing specificity of professional backgrounds. 1
84
3. Trustee Oversight
The Proposals for Change supported continued IASB independence by
clarifying that, although the Trustees could review the IASB's agenda, the
Trustees would not control the agenda. Under the Proposals for Change,
the Trustees would be required to "review annually the strategy of the IASC
Foundation and the IASB and its effectiveness, including consideration, but
179 Id. 40. They proposed changing the phrase "Asia/Pacific" to "Asia/Oceana" to make
clear that North and South American countries on the Pacific Ocean are not intended to be
treated as part of this grouping. Id. 36.
IS0 Proposals for Change, supra note 126, 32.
181 Id. T 40.
182 Id. T 43.
183 Id. 44.
184 Id. T 47. It removed a provision giving IFAC the right to nominate five Trustees, but
included a provision that "two of the Trustees shall normally be senior partners of prominent
international accounting firms." Id. 33, 49.
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not determination, of the IASB's agenda."' 185 The Trustees stated that theY
continue to believe that the IASB must retain the ability to set its agenda. 6
They specifically rejected Trustee control over the IASB agenda:
Some respondents called for a specific requirement for the Trustees to
approve the IASB's agenda. Such a requirement would be inconsistent
with the aim of leaving the technical decision-making process to an
appointed expert group, the IASB. The consideration of the IASB's
agenda should not be interpreted as authority to impose or determine the
agenda, which is for the IASB to establish and approve subject to
appropriate consultation. The purpose of 'consideration' is to
determine, consistently with the Trustees' oversight role, whether the
IASB has followed appropriate procedures and criteria for establishing
its agenda and has received comment on its agenda from the Trustees.'
187
In recognition of proposals that Trustee oversight of the IASB should
be increased, the Trustees proposed changing the wording in Paragraph
32(c) dealing with the IASB's power over its agenda from an articulation
that the IASB shall have full discretion "over" its technical agenda to a
statement that it will have full discretion "in developing and pursuing the
technical agenda."' 8 8 The Proposals for Change again indicated that the
IASB's independence should be preserved, stating:
The Trustees emphasized that the change in wording should not be
interpreted as an intention to undermine the IASB's independence in
standard-setting. For that reason the IASB's sole right to develop and
pursue its agenda remains clear.
Thus, the final proposal was to give the Trustees an increased
oversight role, but not the right to control the IASB's agenda. 190
4. Funding
Regarding funding, the Trustees proposed changing the wording of
Section 14(a) of the Constitution dealing with fundraising to require IASCF
Trustees to "satisfy themselves that appropriate financing arrangements are
185 Id. 57.




190 The Trustees also rejected a proposal that the word "approve" be included in the
provision instructing the Trustees to establish and amend the IASB's due process. Id. 57
(proposing, instead, to require the Trustees to "establish and amend the operating
procedures, consultative arrangements and due process for the IASB, the International
Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee and the Standards Advisory Council").
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in place." The existing language required Trustees to assume
"responsibility for fundraising."' 191 In proposing the change, the Trustees
recognized the possibility of establishing "various fee-based systems,"'
' 92
possibly similar to the fee system established in the United States for the
FASB.' 93
They noted independence concerns relating to partial dependence on
voluntary contributions, including possible lack of objectivity in an effort to
please contributors and possible withdrawal of funding by dissatisfied
contributors, leading to disruption of the IASB's work.
194
5. IASB Composition
IASB Board composition is crucial to its independence. The Trustees
rejected a possible increase in part-time Board members and instead
recommended keeping the number of part-timers at two. They proposed
language making clear that "part-time" means a substantial time
commitment, as follows:
The remaining two members shall be part-time members (the expression
"part-time" meaning that the members concerned commit most of their
time in paid employment to the IASC Foundation).... 195
The Trustees noted that the proposal to "keep the existing limit of two
for part-time members" was favored "by a narrow majority,"'196 and
solicited "additional views on the issue" during the final comment period.
197
They added that the issue of representativeness versus independence is
raised by the "part-time" requirements. They noted that those favoring
increasing part-time members argue that such members would give the
IASB "a better understanding of the practical issues related to standard-
setting.
'' 98
The Trustees noted that those opposing the increase had pointed to the
potential for increased conflicts of interest, and had expressed concern that
part-time members might not be able to handle the workload.' 99 The view
that part-time members might not be able to handle the workload seems to
be bolstered by the Trustees' proposal that part-time members commit
191 Proposals for Change, supra note 126, 68.
192 Id.
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"most" of their time to the FASB rather than "less than all" of their time.2°0
The Trustees did not accept proposals for geographic balance. They
recognized the argument that a geographic basis for membership would
assist the board in understanding the impact of IFRSs in particular
regions, 20' but stated that:
[T]he Trustees believe that introducing geographical elements into the
IASB's membership would be inconsistent with the aim of ensuring the
independence of judgment and the priority for convergence. The
Trustees point out that the logic of the present organizational
arrangements is that decision-making is delegated to professional
standard-setters, who do not make the decision as representatives of
particular countries, but on the basis of the technical merits of a
particular argument and the objective of worldwide application of a
standard.
202
In one respect the Trustees' proposals may be seen as reducing IASB
independence. The Trustees proposed replacing the phrase "the foremost
qualifications" for IASB membership shall be "technical expertise," with
the requirement that the "main qualifications" be "professional competence
and practical experience." 203 However, in response to contentions that
technical expertise would no longer be a criterion, the Trustees expressed
the belief that their proposed changes would convey a broader range of
skills, but that "technical expertise and substantive knowledge remain key
qualifications. ,
204
The Trustees also recommended abandoning the complex numerical
formula for backgrounds as auditors, preparers, users, and academics and
proposed substituting a provision that: "The Trustees shall select IASB
members so that the IASB as a group provides an appropriate mix of recent
practical experience among auditors, preparers, users, and academics. 2 5
This change will make it easier for Trustees to achieve desirable balance on
the IASB.
6. Liaison Relationships
The Trustees endorsed suggestions that the IASB's formal liaison
relationships with standard setters be replaced with a non-specific
200 Id. 76 (suggesting changes to Article 19).
201 Id. 93.
202 Id. 94.
203 Proposals for Change, supra note 126, 77 (proposing amendments to Article 21).
204Id. 87.
205 Id. 80.
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206
expectation of wide ranging liaison activities.. As more countries adopt
IFRSs, this change should provide the IASB with more flexibility in
achieving convergence.
7. Consultative Arrangements
Despite calls for changes in due process, the Trustees did not propose
making changes to IASB process. Instead, they recognized that the IASB
was conducting its own internal review of its due process and endorsed the
IASB's efforts to improve due process voluntarily.20 7 The Trustees
declined to propose to "enshrine" more detailed due process requirements in
the Constitution than those already present,08 but did propose to add a
comply-or-explain" requirement.
8. IASB Voting Procedures
Regarding the IASB's voting procedures, the Trustees noted that
debate on the issue had produced strongly held views both in favor of and
against requiring nine votes for the IASB to publish a standard or exposure
draft, or interpretation instead a majority of eight votes.210 Proponents
argued that larger majorities "would provide more credibility" for standards
upon adoption,211 while opponents countered that the nine vote requirement
might "compromise the quality of standards-to get standards approved by
the necessary supermajority, the IASB might be forced to add special
exceptions and compromises. 12 The Trustees voted in the end to propose
the nine vote supermajority requirement.21 3
9. The Standards Advisory Committee
In recognition of the desirability of a better advisory role for the
Standards Advisory Council, the Trustees asked the SAC members to
review the role and function of the SAC. In response, the SAC proposed a
revised SAC Charter aimed at enhancing the SAC's effectiveness. The
Trustees published the proposed new SAC charter as an attachment to
206 id. 99.
207 Id. 113. The IASB's plan is described in "Recommendations regarding the IASB's
consultative procedures." Id. app. C.
208 Id. 111.
209 Proposals for Change, supra note 126, 106 (proposing to add art. 32(g) to require
the IASB to "give reasons if it does not follow any of the non-mandatory procedures set out
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Proposals for Change, but did not advance the new Charter as a
Constitutional amendment. A proposal to amend the Constitution to
provide that the Chairman of the Council would "not be a member of the
IASB or a member of its staff' 214 was received positively by commentators.
Suggestions for improvement in SAC due process were reflected in the
proposed new SAC Charter.
F. Support for Independence
With the exception of the new supermajority voting requirement, the
Trustees' proposals were clearly intended to preserve the IASB's
independence. The Trustees emphasized that there is no "intent to
undermine the IASB's independence in standard setting" and that "the
IASB's sole right to set its agenda remains clear.,
215
The ability of the IASB to avoid the perception and reality of being
dominated by any interest will improve its chances of bringing about global
convergence, in part because regulators, including the SEC, will be more
likely to accept standards created by an independent body and in part
because independence will be crucial to the convergence process.
G. Responses to Proposals for Change
Following the IASCF's publication of Proposals for Change, letter
responses were received from sixty-six commentators regarding the
216Constitution Review. 6 The responses were favorable to most of the
Trustee positions, but some topics continued to receive critical comment,
primarily from Europeans.
The European commentators urged: 1) greater European representation
in the IASCF and the IASB; 2) greater numbers of part-time members in the
IASB; 3) greater oversight of the IASB by the Trustees; and 4) greater
Trustee accountability. Some sought delay in adoption of amendments to
the IASCF Constitution.
The European Commission expressed concern about the "overall
accountability of international standard setters." It urged "appropriate
procedures for the selection and appointment of Trustees," increased
membership in the IASB, IFRIC and the Board of Trustees from countries
that use IFRSs, and better monitoring by the Trustees of the IASB,
including power to approve "the IASB's work program."
2 1 7
214 Id. 123.
215 Proposals for Change, supra note 126, 109.
216 The comment letters were posted on the IASB web site, available at
http://www.iasb.org/current/iasctcommet.asp (Mar. 31, 2005).
217 Comment Letter from Alexander Schaub on the European Commission International
Market and Series DG to Tom Seidenstein (Mar. 7, 2005), available at
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The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group expressed concern
about "lack of accountability and public oversight," including the fact that
the IASCF Trustees are "self-perpetuating." It urged greater Trustee
oversight of the IASB, including the "prioritization of the agenda" and
greater numbers of appointments of Trustees and Board members from
countries applying IFRSs, especially Europe. It particularly recommended
"postponing the final decision of the constitutional review and putting
forward new proposals to ensure European acceptance. 218
A joint letter by FEE, CEA, EBF, UNICE, and EFRAG noted a
European debate on the "social and economic implications of IFRSs" and
urged extension of the "period of the Constitutional Review." The letter
was supportive of the work of the IASB but urged greater Trustee oversight,
including agenda review, additional European membership in IASCF and
IASB, and an increased role for EFRAG.219
Strong general support for the IASB was offered by both the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the International
Organization of Securities Regulation (IOSCO) 220 in identical language:
A. It is important to protect the independence of the IASB.
B. The needs of investors should be paramount in IFRSs.
C. Board members should be chosen based on their knowledge and
qualifications, as well as their ability to help the Board complete its
mission.
D. A credible authoritative standard setter needs transparent and effective due
221process.
H. IASCF Trustee Action
At their meeting on March 18, 2005, the IASCF Trustees considered
each of the areas discussed in the Proposals for Change, but agreed to
postpone final decisions on revisions of the Constitution for an additional
http://www.iasb.org/docs/2005-itc/c166.pdf.
218 Comment Letter from Grran Tidstr6m, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, and Stig Envoldson, Chairman of the
EFRAG Technical Expert Group, to Paul Volker (Mar. 10, 2005), available at
http://www.iasb.org/docs/2005-itc/c165.pdf. See discussion of EFRAG, infra Part IV.C.2.a.
219 Comment Letter from David Deevlin, FEE President; Gbrard de la Martini~re, CEA
President; Michael Pdbereau, EBF President; Phillippe de Buck, UNICE Secretary General,
and Grran Tidstrrm, Chairman of the EFRAG Supervisory Board to Paul Volker (Mar. 7,
2005) (on file with Professor Ruder).
220 Comment Letter from John Tiner, Chairman of CESR Fin., to Erik Wong (Mar. 2,
2005), available at http:// www.iasb.org/docs/2005-itc/c162.pdf; Comment Letter from
Andrew Sheng, Chairman of the IOSCO Technical Committee, to Erik Wong (Feb. 26,
2005), available at http:/ www.iasb.org/docs/2005-itc/cl8.pdf.
221 Id.
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unspecified period of time, with the goal of taking final action on the
Constitution by written ballot prior to a planned June Trustees meeting.
Although a final decision on the complete package of proposals was
postponed, the Trustees voted upon and approved with minor changes the
Constitutional amendments contained in the Proposals for Change with one
exception. While indicating general support for their proposal regarding the
number and geographical distribution of the Trustees, the Trustees left the
matter open for further discussion. On the issue of Trustee accountability,
the Trustees agreed to consider whether the advice of various official
international organizations should be sought when the Trustees are
selected.222
Unless unexpected changes in views occur, it appears very likely that
the Proposals for Change will be adopted, and that some mechanism for
consultation regarding Trustee appointments will be adopted by Trustee
resolution. 223
IV. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS DEMONSTRATE THE
VALUE OF STANDARD SETTER INDEPENDENCE FOR THE
CONVERGENCE OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
It appears likely that the Trustees Constitution Review process will
reinforce the independence of the IASB. Independence has allowed the
FASB and IASB to make significant collaborative strides toward
convergence. This part begins by discussing the Norwalk Agreement,
which forms the basis for collaboration between the FASB and the IASB,
and the combined IASB-FASB project on business combinations, which
illustrates the capability of independent standard setters to reach
convergence.
The potential damage to independent standard setting will be
demonstrated by discussion of attempts by business interests to persuade
the U.S. Congress to subvert the FASB's standard setting authority over
accounting for stock options expense. This attempted interference in
standard setting has threatened to the viability of the FASB.
The European Union's 2002 decision to adopt IFRSs for all of its
listed companies was a significant stride toward convergence. The
European Union's representative endorsement structure has thus far allowed
business interests to prevent certain sections of the IASB standard on
222 Comment Letter from Andrew Sheng, supra note 220, at 1; Comment Letter from
John Tiner, supra note 220, at 1.
223 See Process for Constitutional Review, supra note 148. This article bears a publication
date of April 6, 2005, at which time final action by the Trustees had not yet occurred. The
above comments are based upon Professor Ruder's recollection of events that occurred at the
March 18 Trustee meeting, which he attended. The Constitutional Review portion of the
meeting was open to the public.
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financial instruments from being adopted in the European Union, but since
this interference has occurred at the endorsement level and not the standard
setting level, it preserves the concept of independent standard setting.
These episodes of attempted interference by business interests with the
standard setting of the FASB and the IASB demonstrate the importance of
independence. If business interests have direct control over standard
setting, convergence will become very difficult to achieve. The European
episode demonstrates a distinction between interference at the standard
setting level and interference at the endorsement or adoption level.
Interference at the adoption level is consistent with the fact that each
country retains the right to accept, modify or reject converged standards.
Indeed, endorsement or adoption structures that are representative in
character, like that of the European Union, may protect convergence in the
long run. If business interests seeking to dislodge standards focus their
efforts on the endorsement level, instead of attempting to reduce the
independence of the IASB, independent standard setting by the IASB will
be protected.
A. FASB - IASB Cooperation: Successful Interaction of Independent
Standard Setters
1. The Norwalk Agreement
As currently constituted, the FASB and the IASB are united by a
common philosophy: pursuit of converged high-quality accounting
standards. The IASB's independence can be attributed in part to support
from the independent FASB, and from the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. During the past three years, the FASB and the IASB have
made ground breaking strides toward convergence.226
On September 18, 2002, the FASB and the IASB held a historic joint
meeting at the FASB's Norwalk, Connecticut headquarters. At that
meeting, the two standard setters, in what has since become known as the
224 FASB Expresses Faith in New IASB, THE ACCT., Feb. 26, 2001 (discussing
membership on the IASB of FASB member Anthony Cope and former member James
Leisenring); FASB Has a Responsibility to Participate in L4SB Processes, THE AcCT., June
23, 2001 (discussing the international perception that "U.S. standard setters have an
obligation to participate within a process they had a strong hand in developing.")
225 See FASB Has a Responsibility to Participate in the IASB Processes, supra note 224
(quoting the chair of the Australian Accounting Standards Board's assessment that the SEC's
influence was instrumental in establishing the IASB as a full-time board).
226 For background information on the relations between the FASB and the IASC prior to
the IASC's 2001 restructuring, see, e.g., David S. Ruder, Reconciling U.S. Disclosure Policy
with International Accounting and Disclosure Standards, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus 1 (1996).
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Norwalk Agreement, 227  acknowledged "their commitment to the
development of high quality... accounting standards that could be used for
both domestic and cross-border financial reporting. ' '228 They agreed to
move toward convergence between IFRSs and U.S. GAAP by making
"their existing financial reporting standards fully compatible as soon as..
practicable" 229 and by coordinating their future work programs so that
compatibility is maintained. 230  The FASB and the IASB published a
Memorandum of Understanding in which both boards agreed to:
a. Undertake a short-term project aimed at removing a variety of
individual differences between U.S. GAAP and International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs, which include International
Accounting Standards, lASs);
b. Remove other differences between IFRSs and U.S. GAAP that will
remain at January 1, 2005, through coordination of their future work
programs; that is, through the mutual undertaking of discrete,
substantial projects which both Boards would address concurrently;
c. Continue progress on the joint projects that they are currently
undertaking; and
d. Encourage their respective interpretive bodies to coordinate their
activities.231
To accomplish the first point of the Agreement, the FASB and the
IASB undertook seven short-term convergence projects. These projects
involved comparison between the two boards of corresponding existing
standards and the adoption of the higher quality one.232
2. The Business Combinations Project
The third point of the Norwalk Agreement, referring to joint projects
currently being undertaken, is well-illustrated by the successful project on
business combinations. This project was successfully completed despite
227 Financial Accounting Standards Board and International Accounting Standards Board,
Memorandum of Understanding, "The Norwalk Agreement" (Sept. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.fasb.org/news/memorandum.pdf [hereinafter The Norwalk Agreement]. See
also Press Release, Financial Accounting Standards Board and International Accounting
Standards Board, FASB and IASB Agree to Work Together toward Convergence of Global
Accounting Standards (Oct. 29, 2002), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/press/
2002prl 5.pdf [hereinafter Norwalk Agreement Press Release].




232 See Press Release, Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Issues Exposure
Drafts to Improve Accounting Guidance and Support Convergence of Global Accounting
Standards (Dec. 15, 2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nrl 21503.shtml.
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objections from portions of the U.S. business community. On July 20,
2001, the FASB completed a standard setting project on business
combinations by publishing two statements: FAS 141, Business
Combinations,/ and FAS 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets.23 4
FAS 141 required the use of the purchase method of accounting instead of
the pooling of assets method of accounting for business combinations. In
addition, the FASB decided that a reconsideration of its guidance regarding
goodwill would be necessary as a result of FAS 141.235 Concurrently, the
IASB began a project to rewrite its own business combinations standards.
In September 2001, the FASB and the IASB decided to establish a joint
project to create standards on applying the purchase method that could be
used by both standard setters.236
On December 4, 2002, the IASB issued two exposure drafts-a new
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 22, Business Combinations, and
changes to IAS 36, Impairment of Assets, and to IAS 38, Intangible
Assets.237 The new IAS 22 required the use of the purchase accounting
method for business combinations. The net effect of the replaced IAS 22
and the changes to IAS's 36 and 38 was to converge the IASB's standards
with the FASB's new FASs 141 and 142. The convergence was not exact
but it gave the sets of standards the following similarities:
The pooling-of-interest method would be prohibited, acquired intangible
items would be recognized as assets separately from goodwill,
identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed would be initially
measured at fair value, and there would be no amortization of goodwill
or intangible assets with indefinite use-lives.238
Despite minor dissimilarities, the approval of the exposure drafts'
changes brought the IASB substantially into line with the FASB as both
boards pursued the joint project on the application of the purchase method.
The IASB published the exposure drafts as a full-fledged standard and
233 BusiNEss COMBINATIONS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141
(Financial Accounting Standards Board 2001) [hereinafter FAS 141].
234 GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 142 (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2001) [hereinafter FAS 142].
235 Hilary K. Krane, The Death of Pooling of Interest: FAS 141 & 142 & Related
Developments, 1286 PRAC. L. INST./CoRP. 623, 627 (2002).
236 Sylwia Gomik-Tomaszewski & Irene McCarthy, Cooperation Between FASB and
IASB to Achieve Convergence ofAccounting Standards, REV. OF Bus., 52, 55 (Spring 2003).
237 IAS 22 BuSINESs COMBINATIONS, Exposure Draft, (Int'l Accounting Standards Bd.
2002); AMENDMENTS TO IAS 36 IMPAIRMENTS OF ASSETS AND IAS 38 INTANGIBLE ASSETS,
Exposure Draft, (Int'l Accounting Standards Bd. 2002).
238 Sylwia Gomik-Tomaszewski, Proposed Standard on Business Combinations Would
Conform to FASB Statements, BANK ACCT. & FIN., June 2003, at 38.
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amendments on March 31, 2004.239 The new IAS 22, Business
Combinations, which was issued as International Financial Reporting
Standard (IFRS) 3, was "hailed as a prime example of how convergence of
currently divergent accounting standards could be satisfactorily
concluded.,
240
The joint project on the purchase method was expected to result in a
common exposure draft, released by both standard setters, during the
second quarter of 2005.241
The cooperation between the IASB and the FASB on business
combinations and the purchase method demonstrates the convergence
possibilities of independent standard setting. In only a few years, the two
boards have moved to establish high quality standards in the business
combination area that have brought U.S. and IASB standards together.
The prohibition of the pooling of interests accounting method in the
business combination context was not uncontroversial in the United States.
Some members of Congress sought to delay the FASB's original business
combinations project.24  In the fall of 2000, the House of Representatives
considered, but never passed, the Financial Accounting for Intangibles
Reexamination (FAIR) Act, which would have imposed a moratorium on
the FASB's plan to eliminate the pooling-of-interests method.243
Simultaneously, a group of Senators sought assurances from the FASB that
the project would be postponed.244 However, Congress did not attempt to
interfere further with the FASB's plan after the publication of FAS 141 and
239 IAS 22 BusINEss COMBINATIONS, IFRS 3 (Int'l Accounting Standards Bd.); see also
IASB and FASB Reveal Joint Efforts on Standards Convergence, THE AcCT., Apr. 30, 2004.
240 IASB and FASB Reveal Joint Efforts on Standards Convergence, supra note 243.
241 The release of combined exposure drafts was originally scheduled for the fourth
quarter of 2004, then postponed to the first quarter of 2005. See IASB Endorses Forming
Joint Proposal with FASB on Business Combinations, BNA's BANKING REP., Aug. 2, 2004;
Robert Willens, Judgment Call: Mood Swing, THEDEAL.COM, Sept. 14, 2004. However, the
FASB and the IASB decided to delay the drafts, FASB, Project Updates, at
http://www.fasb.org/projectibc_purchmethod.shtml (Mar. 8, 2005).
242 See Ted Bridis, Delay in Change on Merger Rules Sought in Congress, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 4, 2000, at A6 (reporting on efforts in both houses of Congress to delay the FASB's
plans to eliminate the use of the pooling method of accounting for business combinations).
243 Financial Accounting for Intangibles Reexamination Act, H.R. 5365, 106th Cong.
(2000) (imposing moratorium on elimination of pooling-of-interests method and establishing
a Congressional Commission on Financial Accounting for Intangibles to consider related
issues).
244 See Letter from Sen. Spencer Abraham and twelve other senators to Edmund Jenkins
(Sept. 29, 2000) (on file with Professor Ruder) (urging FASB chair Jenkins for "assurance
that FASB will take no conclusive action on its current project on business combinations
until Congress has reconvened in 2001"); Letter from Edmund Jenkins to Sen. Spencer
Abraham (Oct. 4, 2000) (on file with Professor Ruder) (assuring Sen. Abraham that "[tihe
Board will not begin discussion of [the pooling-of-interests issue] until" it has completed the
business-combinations project, no earlier than the first quarter of 2001).
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FAS 142 in 2001.
B. Stock Options: Political Interference in the United States
This subsection discusses the attempts of business interests in the
United States to persuade Congress to overrule the FASB's stock options
accounting standard.
1. The FASB's 1995 Retreat
The question whether companies should be required to report
compensation expense when they issue stock options to employees has been
controversial in the United States for over ten years.245 Until the 1990s, the
reporting of stock options was governed by the old Accounting Principles
Board's Opinion No. 25 (APB No. 25),246 which instructed companies to
report stock options using the "intrinsic value" method.24 7  The intrinsic
value method measures the compensation expense of stock options as "the
excess, if any, of the quoted market price of the stock at grant date over the
amount an employee must pay to acquire the stock., 2 4 & Under the most
common type of stock option compensation, fixed stock option plans, there
is usually no difference between the two amounts. Stock options of that
type usually involve no reportable compensation expense under the intrinsic
value method.249
In 1993, the FASB released an exposure draft, Accounting for Stock-
based Compensation, that would have required companies to report stock-
option compensation expense using the fair value method.250 Under the fair
value method, "compensation cost is measured at the grant date based on
the value of the award and is recognized over the [employee's] service
period., 251 Compared to the intrinsic value method, the fair value method
245 See Gomik-Tomaszewski & McCarthy, supra note 236, at 57.
246 ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYERS, Opinion No. 25 (Acct. Principles Bd.
1972).
247 ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Summary of Statement No. 123 (Fin.
Acct. Standards Bd. 1995), available at http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsuml23.shtml
[hereinafter SUMMARY OF STATEMENT No. 123]; see also Sylwia Gomik-Tomaszewski &
Irene McCarthy, Cooperation Between FASB and IASB to Achieve Convergence of
Accounting Standards, REv. OF BUS., Spring 2003, at 57.
248 SUMMARY OF STATEMENT No. 123, supra note 247.
249 Id.
250 ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Exposure Draft (Financial
Accounting Standards Bd. 1993); see also The FASB Stock Options Proposal: Its Effect on
the U.S. Economy and Jobs: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov't
Sponsored Enters., House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 184-85 (2004) (statement of
Robert Herz, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. & George J. Batavick, Member, Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd.) [hereinafter Herz & Batavick Statement].
251 SUMMARY OF STATEMENT NO. 123, supra note 247.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 25:513 (2005)
frequently results in large increases in reported compensation expense for
companies that make extensive use of stock option compensation, with
negative effects on reported earnings.
U.S. companies lobbied Congress to prevent the FASB from
maintaining the exposure draft's strict fair value expensing of stock
options.252  In the spring of 1994, the Senate passed a non-binding
resolution expressing the view that the FASB's proposal would "have grave
economic consequences" and the further view that the FASB should not
change "the current treatment of stock option plans. 253 In 1995, the FASB
reacted to business pressure and the Senate resolution by issuing a
compromise stock option compensation standard. Statement No. 123254 set
forth the fair value method as the preferred approach but also allowed
companies to continue to apply the APB No. 25 intrinsic value method if
they disclosed pro forma net income and earnings per share figures
calculated using the fair value method in financial statement footnotes.255
Within Statement No. 123, the FASB explained why it had chosen to
"encourage, rather than require," the use of the fair value method:
[I]n December 1994, the Board decided that the extent of improvement
in financial reporting that was envisioned when this project was added
to its technical agenda ... was not attainable because the deliberate,
logical consideration of issues that usually leads to improvement in
financial reporting was no longer present .... The Board chose a
disclosure-based solution for stock-based employee compensation to
bring closure to the divisive debate on this issue-not because it
believes that solution is the best way to improve financial accounting
252 See Christi Harlan, High Anxiety: Accounting Proposal Stirs Unusual Uproar in
Executive Suites: FASB's Stock-Option Plan Threatens Pay Packages; Lobbying Gets
Intense," WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, at Al (reporting on the lobbying efforts of business
interests, including personal efforts by executives from MCI Communications Corp.,
Raychem Corp., and Citicorp to persuade Congress to derail FAS No. 123); Calvin Johnson,
The Disloyalty of Stock and Stock Option Compensation, 11 CONN. INS. L. J. 133, 139 (2004-
2005).
253 S. Amdt. 1668 § 2(a) to S. 783, 103rd Cong. (1994) (enacted) (expressing the non-
binding sense of the Senate that "the new accounting treatment of employee stock
options... proposed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, will have grave
economic consequences, particularly for businesses in new-growth sectors which rely
heavily on employee entrepreneurship... [and] will diminish rather than expand broad-
based employee stock option plans; the Financial Accounting Standards Board should
not ... change the current generally accepted accounting treatment of stock options.")
254 ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 123 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1995), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123.pdf [hereinafter FAS No. 123].
255 Id.; see also SUMMARY OF STATEMENT No. 123, supra note 247; Share Options Debate
Looms Again in the US, THE ACCT., Oct. 26, 2001, at 15; Legislation Introduced to Overturn
FASB Stock Option Proposal, J. OF ACCT., Oct. 1993, at 15-16.




2. IASB Action on Stock Options
In July 2000, the IASB produced a discussion paper, Accounting for
Share-Based Payment, addressing an area in which there was no IASB
standard. 7  In September 2001, the new IASB asked the public for
additional comment on the paper.258 IASB Chairman Sir David Tweedie
discussed the need for an international standard on stock options:
The widespread use of share options to pay employees, external
advisors, and others; the calls from users of financial statements for
improvements in accounting for these transactions; and the differing
proposals emanating from national standard-setters demonstrate the
importance of developing a high-quality global accounting standard for
share-based payment.
259
U.S. corporations that had opposed the FASB's attempt to impose fair
value expensing of stock options, understanding that the IASB and the
FASB were seeking to converge their sets of standards, worried that the
IASB's actions might induce the FASB to try again. Some treated the stock
option question as permanently resolved in the United States and criticized
the IASB's actions as possibly threatening to convergence. Financial
Executives International Chairman Phil Livingston said:
The IASB has an historic opportunity to provide leadership in
converging accounting standards around the world. Unfortunately,
some members of the IASB have insisted on restarting this acrimonious
fight with corporations, one that was settled only six years ago.
Requiring expense recognition for employee stock options would well
undermine any chance that we will see harmonization of accounting
standards.
260
256 FAS No. 123, supra note 254, 61-62, quoted in Subcommittee on Capital Mkts.,
Ins. and Gov 't Sponsored Enters. Hearing on the FASB Stock Options Proposal: Its Effect
on the US. Economy and Jobs, 10 8 th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Robert Herz & George
Batavick), available at http://fmancialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/050403fasb.pdf, Full
Text of Testimony at p. 5-6 [hereinafter Herz & Batavick Testimony].
257 INT'L ACCT. STANDARDS COMM'N, G4+1 Position Paper: Accounting for Share-Based
Payment (2000), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/g4sp00/g4sp00.pdf.
258 See Daniel M. Hrisak, IASB Resurrects Heated Discussion about Stock Options,
IOMA's REPORT ON MANAGING THE GENERAL LEDGER, at 3-4 (Nov. 2001).
259 Id.
260 Press Release, Financial Executives International, Stock Options Accounting Project
Could Undermine March Toward Global Accounting Standards (Sept. 21, 2001), available
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 25:513 (2005)
Despite objections, the IASB proposed a stock option expensing
requirement,26' releasing Exposure Draft (ED) 2, Share-Based Payment, on
November 7, 2002.262 The proposed standard required the reporting of
stock option compensation on a fair value basis similar to FASB Statement
No. 123's preferred fair value calculation.263 The IASB published the final
standard, in substantially the same form, in February 2004.264
3. The Continuing U.S. Controversy
During the summer of 2002, the appeal of stock option expensing as a
corporate governance reform was enhanced in the United States by a
perception that "stock option overload contributed to the accounting fiascos
at... Enron Corp. and Worldcom Inc." and other corporations.265
In March 2003, the FASB announced that it had added a stock option
expensing project to its work program.266 The FASB justified this decision
on three grounds: a high volume of requests from users of financial
statements for improvements in this area of financial accounting; the
"complexity and noncomparability" of the different approaches allowed
under the 1995 Statement No. 123; and the "opportunity to achieve
convergence" with international accounting standards in this area.267 The
FASB issued an exposure draft of a new Statement No. 123 on March 31,
2004, with an implementation deadline for corporate fiscal years beginning
at http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT= 104&STORY=/www/story/09-21-
2001/0001576563&EDATE=; see also Share Options Debate Looms Again in the US, supra
note 255, at 15.
261 Amy Borrus, et al., To Expense or Not to Expense: In the Debate Over Stock Options,
Expensing is Picking up Steam, Bus. WK., July 29, 2002, at 44.
262 Press Release, Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., IASB Publishes Proposals on
Accounting for Share-Based Payment (Nov. 7, 2002), available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/
press/2002prl 6.pdf.
263 Gomik-Tomaszewski & McCarthy, supra note 236, at 58.
264 SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, International Financial Reporting Standard 2 (Int'l
Accounting Standards Board- 2004).
265 Amy Borrus, et al., supra note 261; see also The Stock Option Accounting Reform
Act: Hearing on H.R. 3574 Before Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov't Sponsored
Enters., House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 46-47 (2004) (statement of Paul
Kanjorski) (noting "[w]e now know that [the failure to require fair value stock-option
expensing in the mid-1990s] contributed to the financial storm on Wall Street in 2001 and
2002.")
266 Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Minutes, available at http://www.fasb.org/
board meetingminutes/03-12-03_stockcomp.pdf, at 1 (Mar. 12, 2003); see also Press
Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Adds Projects to its Agenda on Employee
Stock Options and Pensions (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/news/
nr031203.shtml.
267 Herz & Batavick Testimony, supra note 256, Full Text of Testimony at 11-14.
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after December 15, 2004.268 The exposure draft closed the Statement No.
123 loophole, requiring the fair value expensing of stock option
compensation for employees.26 9 During the comment period for the
exposure draft, the FASB received over 14,000 comment letters, most of
them unfavorable.270
Early in 2003, U.S. companies, particularly in the high tech industries,
began lobbying Congress to block the possible imposition of the fair value
method on stock option compensation. In the spring of 2003, members of
Congress responded to the lobbying effort by introducing, in both houses, a
bill called the "Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act of
2003 .,,27 1 The bill would have imposed a three-and-a-half year moratorium
on the fair value expensing of stock option compensation. The bill was
referred to the appropriate Senate and House committees, but neither body
took any further action on it.
273
The Congressional challenge to the FASB's control over accounting
standards continued in the fall of 2003. On November 19, 2003, Senator
Michael Enzi (R-Wyoming) introduced the Stock Option Accounting
Reform Act,274 a bill that, if enacted, would preempt the FASB's proposed
Statement No. 123. Among other provisions, the bill required the use of the
fair value method to report stock option compensation-but only for CEOs
and the four other highest compensated executive officers.2 7S It also
prohibited the FASB from requiring companies to use the fair value method
to account for stock option compensation of any employees other than the
five highest paid until after an "economic impact study" had been
performed by the Departments of Labor and Commerce.276 In a statement
268 PROPOSED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: SHARE-BASED
PAYMENT, AN AMENDMENT OF FASB STATEMENTS No. 123 AND 95, Exposure Draft at 23
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2004).
269 For an efficient summary of the provisions of the Exposure Draft, see Herz &
Batavick Testimony, supra note 256, Full Text of Testimony at 15.
270 FASB Concedes to Six-Month Delay over US. Stock Options, THE ACCT., Oct. 31,
2004, at 1.
271 S. 979, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1372, 108th Cong. (2003).
272 S. 979 § 4; H.R. 1372 § 4.
273 Bill Summary for S. 979, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d108:SN00979:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Apr. 5, 2005); Bill Summary for H.R.
1372, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HRO1372:@@@L&
summ2=m& (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
274 S. 1890, 108th Cong. (2003).
275 Id. § 2. Opponents of the legislation rightly charged that this distinction was
nonsensical. See, e.g., The FASB Stock Options Proposal: Its Effect on the U.S. Economy
and Jobs: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enters.,
House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 13 (2004) (statement of Brad Sherman) (noting
"[i]f you are number six at GM, you are probably doing pretty good.")
276 S. 1890, supra note 274, § 3.
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on the Senate floor, Senator Enzi said:
I am very concerned that FASB has repeatedly refused to consider the
economic consequences of its decisions. The mandatory expensing of
all employee stock options has serious economic, labor, trade and
competitiveness implications. These issues fall squarely within the
jurisdiction and oversight of Congress.
277
Senator Enzi's bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, which took no action on it.
On November 21, 2003, two days after the introduction of the Stock
Option Accounting Reform Act in the Senate, identical legislation was
introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Richard Baker
278 .279(R-Louisiana). In a hearing on March 3, 2004, supporters of the
legislation repeatedly argued that the FASB's proposed fair value expensing
of stock options would discourage the use of stock options as
compensation, and that the decreased use of stock options would hurt U.S.
companies' prospects for growth and global competitiveness. 28' FASB
supporters emphasized the need to keep the FASB independent.28'
At hearings on the Hill, FASB Chairman Robert Herz and FASB
member George Batavick summarized the benefits of the FASB's proposal:
"greater transparency, completeness and a more level playing field in the
accounting for different forms of equity-based compensation. ' '282 They also
presented prepared materials supporting the FASB's need for independence
277 149 CONG. REc. 15,188 (2003) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
278 H.R. 3574, 108th Cong. (2003). The House legislation was referred to the Committee
on Financial Services' Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government
Sponsored Enterprises, chaired by Congressman Baker.
279 The Stock Option Accounting Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 3574 Before Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th
Cong. (2004).
280 See id. at 1, 2, 5-7,10-13 (opening statements of Congs. Baker, Crowley, Shadegg,
Moore, Scott, Inslee, Bachus, and Israel).
281 See id. at 2-4, 8-11 (opening statements of Congs. Kanjorski, Gillmor, Emanuel, and
Sherman); see also id. at 50 (Cong. Sherman noting "[m]y fear is that this bill will be the
first step in converting GAAP, generally accepted accounting principles, into GAAP,
generally adulterated accounting politics."); see also The FASB Stock Options Proposal: Its
Effect on the U.S. Economy and Jobs: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins.
and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 11-12 (2004)
(statement of Joseph Crowley, Member, Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. and Gov't
Sponsored Enterprises, House Comm. on Fin. Servs.). This hearing, as its title "Effect on the
U.S. Economy and Jobs," suggests, reflected the perception of the Act's supporters that the
short-term economic effects of the fair value expensing of stock-option compensation
justified Congressional interference with the FASB's proposal.
282 Herz & Batavick Testimony, supra note 256, Prepared Statement at 3.
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in its standard setting activities.
2 83
Despite the testimony from Herz and Batavick, the subcommittee, on
May 12, 2004,284 and the full Committee on Financial Services, on June 15,
2004,285 approved H.R. 3574. The bill passed the House of Representatives
on July 20, 2004, by a vote of 312 to 111, with the support of a wide
majority of Republicans and a narrow majority of Democrats.2 86 H.R. 3574
was received in the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, but the committee took no action on
it or the Enzi bill throughout the rest of 2004.287
4. The FASB Publishes Statement 123 (Revised)
On October 13, 2004, the FASB postponed the new Statement 123's
effective date.288 This gave business interests hope that the FASB planned
to reconsider its decision to require the fair value expensing of stock
options. But the final standard, Statement 123 (Revised 2004), Share-
Based Payment,289 maintained the same posture toward expensing. The
delayed effective date was in part attributable to SEC concerns about the
ability of companies to comply with new Sarbanes-Oxley rules and the
FASB's new statement simultaneously.29 °
In 2005, the opponents of expensing continued lobbying Congress
283 Id. at attachment 2. Herz and Batavick also noted the increasing number of companies
that had elected voluntarily to expense their stock options using the fair-value method. Id. at
attachment 3. They presented a compilation of authorities disagreeing with the contention
that the fair-value expensing of stock-option compensation would hurt the U.S. economy. Id.
at attachment 5.
284 H.R. REP. No. 109-609, pt. 1, at 7 (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/?&db-id=cp 108&r-n=hr6O9pl .108&sel=TOC_24685&.
285 Id.
286 H.R. 3574, 108th Cong. (2004).
287 See, e.g., Donna Block, FASB Rules Defended, Global Regulators Defend Financial
Accounting Standards Board's Efforts on Protecting Employee Stock Options,
THEDEAL.COM, at http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Articles.Detail&
Articleid=65 &Month=9&Year=2004 (Sept. 10, 2004).
288 See Floyd Norris, New Options Accounting Rule is Delayed for U.S. Companies,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 15, 2004, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/10/14/
business/option 15.html.
289 SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2004).
290 Floyd Norris, Audit Board Delays Rule on Options as Expenses, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14,
2004, at Cl; FASB Concedes to Six-Month Delay Over U.S. Stock Options, THE ACCT., Oct.
31, 2004, at 1. See also Memo to Feds: Let the FASB do its Job, INV. NEWS, Oct. 25, 2004,
at 10 (citing FASB chairman Robert Herz as saying that the delay's purpose was to strike a
balance between the needs of companies' auditing processes and investors); David Wang &
Mark von Bergen, Changes to FASB Stock Option Expensing Proposal, Holland + Knight,
Public Companies Alert, Aug. 24, 2004 (quoting Herz as anticipating possible delays,
saying, "We are hearing people say they are stretched to the maximum.")
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regarding stock options. 9t On February 17, 2005, Congresswoman Anna
Eshoo (D-CA) and Congressman David Dreier (R-CA) introduced the
"Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act., 292  The new bill
dropped the Stock Options Accounting Reform Act's requirement of
expensing for each corporation's top five highest paid employees. Instead,
it directed the SEC to require companies to provide "a summary of the
stock options granted to the five most highly compensated executive
officers."29 3 Like the Stock Options Accounting Reform Act, it would have
imposed a moratorium on new stock option accounting rules until the
completion of a lengthy study.
294
In a statement released the day she introduced the bill,
Congresswoman Eshoo dismissed the argument that the FASB's need for
independence suggested Congressional restraint:
Some have ... argued that FASB's independence must be protected and
accounting standards, like other technical rules, should not be set by
Congress. While in general this is the case, there are many occasions
when expert bodies fail to fully protect the public interest and it's
essential that Congress steps in. For example, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, an independent, expert agency, failed to
adequately protect investors and the public from the corporate scandals
of recent years: Congress stepped in to enact the reforms of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
29
5. Outlook for Convergence
Because Congress has so far refused to subvert the FASB's authority,
convergence between U.S. standards and IASB standards on the subject of
stock options has thus far been achieved. If Congress had blocked the
291 Donna Block, Stock Options Fight Rages On, THEDEAL.COM, Jan. 14, 2005; Press
Release, National Venture Capital Association, FASB Final Stock Option Ruling Lacks Real
World Application, at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/ FASBFinalRulingFinal.pdf (Dec. 16, 2004).
292 H.R. 913, 109th Cong. (2005). As of late March 2005, the bill had been referred to
the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises.
293 Id. §3(a)(4).
294 Id. §4(a)-(b). The study required by the Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency
Act differed significantly from the study contemplated by the Stock Options Accounting
Reform Act. The new bill directed the SEC (rather than the Departments of Labor and
Commerce) to perform a study. Moreover, the study was to cover only the effects of the
minimal new disclosure requirements of the Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency
Act, rather than covering "the economic impact of the mandatory expensing of all employee
stock options." Stock Options Accounting Reform Act, supra note 271, §3(b) (emphasis
added).
295 Press Release, Congresswoman Anna G. Eshoo, Eshoo, Drier Introduce Stock Options
Bill: Legislation would protect employee stock options from accounting rule (Feb. 17, 2005).
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FASB from requiring the expensing of stock options, business interests
would have demonstrated their influence on Congress regarding future
standard setting. Instead, the FASB's independence as a standard setter has
so far been protected and it is free to pursue convergence in other areas of
accounting.
C. Adoption of International Accounting Standards in the European Union
The next two subsections discuss the opposition of some European
business interests to the imposition of the IASB's rules on derivatives. As
will be noted in greater detail below, the European Union has decided to
adopt IFRSs for mandatory use by listed companies. This requirement is a
giant leap toward convergence, since it gives validity to IASB standards
and the IASB standard setting process. As part of the adoption process the
European Union has created a complex endorsement mechanism involving
the European Commission.2 97  The endorsement mechanism allows
businesses significant influence on whether specific IASB standards are
endorsed for use in the European Union.
When the IASB proposed its derivatives standards, significant
opposition from business interests developed and pressure was exerted on
the IASB to change those rules to meet the needs of European companies.
The IASB made significant changes, but adhered to the central principles
embodied in its derivatives proposals. Business interests, acting through
the endorsement mechanism, succeeded in preventing the adoption of
296 Opponents of expensing have also attempted to persuade the SEC to refrain from
enforcing Statement 123. This effort has not been successful. See Kevin Drawbaugh, SEC
Chief Firm on Option Expensing Timing Unclear, REUrERs, Feb. 10, 2005.
297 The European Commission, which will sometimes be referred to in this section as "the
Commission," is one of the three bodies that make up the European Union's governing
"institutional triangle." The European Commission's role is to propose legislation to the
other two bodies, the European Parliament and the European Council, and to implement the
decisions of those bodies. A new European Commission is selected every five years. The
member governments of the European Union select a European Commission President, who
then appoints the other members of the European Commission, subject to the approval of the
European Parliament. The number of Commissioners is determined by treaty and has
fluctuated between twenty and thirty. Each Commissioner is responsible for predetermined
areas of E.U. policy. The Commission's policy staff is composed of departments called
Directorates-General headed by Governors-General and each subject to the authority of a
particular Commissioner. See European Union, The European Commission, at
http://europa.eu.int/institutions/comm/index en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). Issues
involving accounting standards are the responsibility of the Internal Market Directorate-
General. Between Sept. 16, 1999 and Nov. 21, 2004, the Internal Market Directorate-General
was answerable to European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein. With the selection of a new
Commission in 2004, Bolkestein retired. The Commissioner with authority over the Internal
Market Directorate-General in the 2004-09 European Commission is Charlie McCreevy.
European Union, European Comission website, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ indexen.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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selected sections of one standard, but the IASB's independence was
maintained. However, convergence of the derivatives standards with U.S.
standards has not occurred and remains subject to further developments.
1. Listed Company Requirement
In February 2001, in the "Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Application of International
Accounting Standards" (the Commission Proposal), the European
Commission proposed the adoption of international accounting standards
created by the IASB for all securities admitted to trading in a regulated
market of any member state of the European Union for each fiscal year
starting on or after January 1, 2005.298 It cited the importance of a single set
of standards as the reason to impose international accounting standards in
Europe:
The lack of comparability in financial reporting has adverse effects for
stake-holders. Adaptation of financial statements to take account of
local conventions was understandable when investors and other
stakeholders were of the same nationality as the company. However,
with the emergence of an integrated financial market, the securities of
any one company are often held by an internationally diverse group of
investors .... [T]he most effective basis for ensuring this objective of
comparability is a requirement for listed companies to publish financial
statements that conform to a single set of standards.
299
The Commission Proposal was approved by the European Parliament
and Council and published on July 19, 2002 (IAS Regulation).300 The
regulation made approval of "international accounting standards"
conditional, stating that international accounting standards can only be
298 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Application of International Accounting Standards, 2001 O.J. (C 154 E) 285
[hereinafter Commission Proposal]; see also Draft Commission Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Application of International Accounting
Standards, Draft, December 2000, available at http://www.iasplus.com/resource/ec0102.pdf
[hereinafter Draft Commission Proposal].
299 Draft Commission Proposal, supra note 298, Explanatory Memorandum at 2-3.
300 IAS Regulation, supra note 2. The regulation provides that "for each year starting on
or after 1 January 2005, companies governed by the law of a member state shall prepare their
consolidated accounts in conformity with the international accounting standards adopted in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 6(2) if, at their balance sheet date, their
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market of any member state .... Id. at art.
4. In Article 2, "International Accounting Standards" are defined as: "International
Accounting Standards (IAS), International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and related
Interpretations (SIC-IRIC)" and subsequent amendments "issued or adopted by the
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB)." Id. at art. 2.
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adopted if they "are conducive to the European public good and meet the
criteria of understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability
required of the financial information needed for making economic decisions
and assessing the stewardship of management.,
30 1
The European Union's adoption of IFRSs assumed that IASB
standards would converge with U.S. standards. The IAS Regulation allows
E.U. member states to delay the imposition of IFRSs for companies that
were already using "internationally accepted standards," such as U.S.
GAAP, but even these companies-including U.S. corporations with
European listings-are required to use IFRSs by 2007.302 This extension
offered the possibility that convergence would be achieved by 2007, so that
the SEC would allow European companies using IFRSs to list on U.S.
exchanges without reconciling their financial statements to U.S. GAAP 3
The adoption of IASB standards for use in the European Union is a
strong positive step towards the convergence goal of common accounting
standards that can be used in cross-border trading. This adoption gives
recognition to IASB standards by a very important capital market.
Converged FASB and IASB standards would offer tremendous
opportunities for securities trading and capital raising in both the United
States and the European Union.
2. The European Endorsement Mechanism
The IAS Regulation provided that each IASB standard had to be
endorsed individually in order to be enforced in the European Union. The
Regulation delegated to the European Commission the authority to decide
whether to endorse each standard.3 4
The IAS Regulation required the Commission to take into account
three minimum criteria when deciding whether to endorse each IASB
standard. 5  Standards must not be contrary to the "true and fair value
principle" set forth in previous E.U. legislation; must be "conducive to the
European public good"; and must "meet the criteria of understandability,
relevance, reliability and comparability."
The procedure chosen for endorsement, called "comitology,"
allows the Commission to endorse or reject IASB standards, but not to
30 Id. at art. 3(2).
302 Id. at art. 9.
303 See, e.g., Interview with Internal Markets Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2002.
304 IAS Regulation, supra note 2, at arts. 3(1), and 6(2). See also KPMG, IFRS and the
E. U. endorsement process: a status report, IFRS Briefing Sheet, Issue 18 (2005); Schaub,
supra note 3, at 618.
305 IAS Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 3(2).
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amend them, and gives the European Parliament power to review the
Commission's decisions. 30 6 Under the comitology procedure the European
Commission is directed to consult with two other bodies while making
decisions on the applicability of standards. First, the IAS Regulation
provides that "[a]n accounting technical committee should provide support
and expertise to the Commission in the assessment of international
accounting standards., 30 7 Second, the Commission is to "be assisted" by an
Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC).30 8
The Accounting Technical Committee and the Accounting
Regulatory Committee had been discussed in the Commission Proposal.30 9
The Proposal had characterized the two bodies as a two-tier "endorsement
mechanism" that would "oversee the adoption of new standards and
interpretations, intervening only when these contain material deficiencies or
have failed to cater for features specific to the E.U. economic or legal
environment.
310
The comitology procedure as it applies to IASB standards is
conducted as follows:
[A]fter an IAS has been adopted by the IASB, the endorsement process
will start with the Commission formally asking EFRAG [the technical
committee] for its view on whether an IAS should be endorsed. Once
the opinion of EFRAG has been received, the Commission will, where
appropriate, draft a proposal for the adoption of the standard. This
proposal will then be discussed by the Accounting Regulatory
Committee... Once the ARC has voted in favour of a proposal, the
Commission takes a formal decision to adopt the IAS on the basis of the
text voted by the ARC. It has no right to change the standard. Once a
standard has been adopted by the Commission, it is then published in
full in each of the official languages of the Community as a Commission
regulation in the Official Journal of the European Union. The standards
306 The procedure is more fully described in Schaub, supra note 4, at 620. Although usual
"comitology" procedure does not allow the European Parliament to review the Commission
endorsement decision, the IAS Regulation sets up a procedure that provided a period during
which the European Parliament may review draft commission proposals and a one month
period in which it could pass a resolution preventing the Commission's final review from
prevailing. Id. at 621. IAS Regulation, supra note 2, Recital (8), arts. 3(1) and 6(2), referring
to arts. 5 and 7 of Decisions 1999/468/EC and specifying a three month period under art.
5(6) of that decision.
307 Id. at recitation (10).
308 Id. at art. 6(1).
309 See Commission Proposal, supra note 298, Explanatory Memorandum at 3.3.
310 Id., Explanatory Memorandum at 4.
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thus become part of Community law.
311
a. EFRAG's Technical Expert Group Serves as the Accounting Technical
Committee
In its proposal the European Commission had suggested forming an
"accounting technical committee" that would "provide the support and
expertise needed to assess the standards on a timely basis." 312  The
Commission believed that the technical committee should be responsible
for involving both "users and preparers" of financial statements in technical
assessments.1 3 The technical committee was mentioned in the recitals of
both the Commission's proposed regulation 314 and, as noted above, the final
E.U. regulation, 315 but was not provided for in the text of either version.
In March 2001 a group of European business and accountancy
organizations, acting at the invitation of the Commission,3 16 proposed the
establishment of a new entity that would provide the technical support
function for the Commission.317 This entity, the European Financial
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), was officially established in June
2001.318 It is made up of two bodies: a Technical Expert Group and a
Supervisory Board of European Organizations.319
The Technical Expert Group serves as the Commission's
320accounting technical committee. It is composed of "highly qualified
experts with proper knowledge of the European and international financial
reporting scene" with "experience in standard setting.' 321 The Supervisory
Board's purpose is "to guarantee representation of the full European interest
311 Schaub, supra note 3, at 621 (internal citation omitted).
312 Commission Proposal, supra note 298, Explanatory Memorandum at 5.
313 Id.
314 Id. at recital 8.
315 IAS Regulation, supra note 2, Recital 10.
316 Press Release, Private Sector Organizes Itself for the Adoption of IAS by 2005 in
Europe: EFRAG, (Mar. 20, 2001), available at http://www.iasplus.com/resource/efrag.pdf
(discussing the Commission's invitation to form EFRAG, accepted by the accountancy
organization Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) on July 31, 2000)
[hereinafter EFRAG Proposal].
317 id.
318 See Press Release, Europe Organizes Itself in the Field of Accounting, (June 26,
2001), available at http://www.iasplus.comresource/efragorg.pdf [hereinafter EFRAG
Establishment Press Release].
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and to enhance the legitimacy and credibility of EFRAG. '32 2  It is
composed of individuals who represent EFRAG's founding organizations,
called EFRAG's "founding fathers."
The organizations that founded EFRAG represent business interests
as well as the accounting profession. EFRAG's "founding fathers" include
UNICE, the organization of European employers; the European Banking
Federation (EBF); the European Association of Cooperative Banks
(GEBC); the Comite Europeen des Assurances (CEA), the Continental
Insurers' Organization; and representatives of small businesses, accountants
and stock exchanges.323
EFRAG characterizes its own function as twofold-first, "[p]ro-
active contribution to IASB" by providing comment on IASB proposals;
and second, "endorsement advice" to the Commission on specific IASB
standards. 324 In fulfilling the second function-the one ordained by the IAS
Regulation-EFRAG "is committed to give its endorsement advice to the
Commission within two months" of the publication of an IASB standard.325
The Technical Expert Group's practice is first to issue a "tentative view,"
then invite comment and give consideration before issuing its final
recommendation. 326 It can recommend in favor of or against endorsement
of an IASB standard or do neither. There is no provision for the number of
members of the Technical Expert Group who must vote in favor of a
standard in order to recommend endorsement. In practice, EFRAG only
issues such a recommendation if a majority of the Technical Expert Group
322 Id.
323 Id. at 2. The other founding fathers are the F~dration des Experts Comptables
Europ6ens (FEE), the European Savings Banks Group (ESBG), the European Association of
Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME), the European Federation of
Accountants and Auditors for SMEs (EFAA), the Federation of European Securities
Exchanges (FESE), and the European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS).
Id. As of February 2004, the members of the Supervisory Board were chairman G6ran
Tidstr6m; deputy chairman John Glen, representing UNICE; Philippe Crouzet, representing
UNICE; Peter Sampers, representing UNICE; Maije Torkko, representing UNICE; David
Devlin, representing FEE; Hans van Damme, representing FEE; Klaus-Giinter Klein,
representing FEE; David Lindsell, representing FEE; Jos Streppel, representing CEA; Hervd
Guider, representing GEBC; Paul Chisnall, representing FBE; Chris de Noose, representing
ESBG; Paul Arlman, representing FESE; Javier de Frutos, representing EFFAS; Jan
Verhoeye, representing UEAPME and EFAA; and Jiirgen Tiedje, representing the European
Commission as a non-voting observer. EFRAG website, at http://www.efrag.org (last
visited Feb. 14, 2005).
3" EFRAG, EFRAG Due Process, Explanatory Memorandum at 10, available at
http://www.efrag.org/doc/53_EFRAG%2ODueProcess.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
325 Id. at 3.1.
326 Id. at Explanatory Memorandum, 12, 15.
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supports a standard.327 Two-thirds of the Technical Expert Group must vote
against a standard in order for EFRAG to issue a recommendation against
endorsement.328 When this happens, the Supervisory Board submits "a
separate statement directly to the Commission to provide its
commentary., 329 An abstaining vote by a member of the Technical Expert
Group is "counted as a vote in favor of the endorsement.,
330
The members of the Technical Expert Group are experienced
European standard setters, accounting firm partners, preparers, and
academics.331 When EFRAG appointed the first members of the Technical
Expert Group in June 2001,332 Jean den Hoed, the EFRAG Supervisory
Board's first Deputy Chairman, stated that the Technical Expert Group
would be an independent body: "It is important that the experts appointed
have been selected because of their technical excellence. They have agreed
to work independently in the European interest. This aspect will be closely
monitored by the EFRAG Supervisory Board. 3 33
b. The Establishment of the ARC
The Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC) was established by
the European Commission in 2002334 and is governed by the Commission's
327 See Comment Letter from EFRAG to the European Commission (July 8, 2004)
(Recommendation on the Adoption of the Amended IAS 39 Financial Instruments:
Recognition and Measurement), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/
accounting/docs/ias/efrag/efrag-2004-07-a-endorsement-letteren.pdf (noting that EFRAG
has "decided only to issue a positive endorsement advice if there is a majority supporting
endorsement.") [hereinafter EFRAG IAS 39 Recommendation].
328 EFRAG, Due Process, supra note 324, at 3.7.
329 Id. at Explanatory Memorandum, 13.
330 Id.
331 The current members of the Technical Expert Group are Stig Enevoldsen, a partner at
Deloitte in Denmark; Allan Cook, a Technical Director of the United Kingdom's Accounting
Standards Board; Francoise Flores, a member of multiple steering committees of CNC, the
French standard-setter; Begofia Giner Inchausti, Professor in Accounting and Finance at the
University of Valencia; French Deloitte partner Catherine Guttman; Hans Leeuwerik,
member of the preparers delegation of CAR, the Dutch standard-setter; Ugo Marinelli,
Professor of Auditing at Rome University; Thomas Naumann, Senior General Manager and
Chief Financial Officer at the Institutional Restructuring Unit of Dresdner Bank; Friedrich
Spandl, co-head of the rating / consulting division of Vienna's Bank fir Arbeit und
Wirtschaft AG (BAWAG); and Dominique Thouvenin, Director of Accounting at Ernst &
Young, France. EFRAG website, at http://www.efrag.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
332 EFRAG, Establishment Press Release, supra note 318.
333 Id. at 2.
334 European Commission, Rules of Procedure for the Accounting Regulatory
Committee, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/accounting/docs/arc/arc-
rules en.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter ARC Rules of Procedure].
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standard committee operating rules.3 35 It is made up of delegations from
each E.U. Member State. The delegations are made up of representatives of
Member States' "administrations responsible for accounting issues., 336 As
of December 2004, organizations sending representatives included a wide
range of agencies, ministries, national banks and non-governmental
organizations.33 7 A procedure called Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)
assigns a different number of votes to each Member State's delegation, so
that the voting strength of the delegations varies. For example, the U.K.
delegation has 29 votes and Latvia has 4. The total number of votes is
321 .3
The ARC's function, according to the European Commission,
"consists in providing an opinion" when the Commission has proposed to
endorse an IASB standard.339  To approve a standard, at least thirteen
335 Council Decision 1999/468/EC, Rules of Procedure for the ... Committee, 2001 O.J.
(C 38) 3-5 (setting forth generic rules of procedure for European Commission committees).
336 European Commission, E.U. Accounting Regulatory Committee Opinion on IAS 39,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/accounting/docs/ias/2004-10-arc-
opinion en.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
337 See Accounting Regulatory Committee, Summary Report, Meeting of the Accounting
Regulatory Committee (Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal market/accounting/docs/arc/2004-12-20-summary-record en.pdf (last visited
February 8, 2005), Participants' List, 9. Participating in the December 20, 2004 meeting of
the ARC were representatives of the following entities: from Austria, the Justizministerium,
the Finanzministerium, and the Finanzmarktaufsicht; from Belgium, the Fod. Economie;
from Cyprus, the Ministry of Finance; from the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Finance;
from Denmark, the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, the Danish
Commerce and Companies Agency, and the Danish FSA; from Estonia, the Permanent
Representation to the European Union; from France, the Conseil National de la
Compatabilitd (CNC), the Minist~re de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie (Trdsor),
and the SGCI/Premier Ministre; from Finland, the Permanent Representation to the
European Union; from Germany, the Permanent Representation to the European Union; from
Greece, the Ministry of Economy and Finance; from Hungary, the Permanent Representation
to the European Union; from Ireland, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland and
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment; from Italy, CONSOB, ISVAP, the
Ministry of Economy and Finance, and Banca d'Italia; from Latvia, the Ministry of Finance;
from Lithuania, the Ministry of Finance and the Accounting Institute; from Luxembourg, the
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier and the Ministdre de la Justice; from
Malta, the Accountancy Board; from The Netherlands, the Ministerie van Justitie and the
Ministry of Finance; from Poland, the Ministry of Finance; from Portugal, CMVM and
CNC; from Slovakia, no representative; from Slovenia, the Slovenian Institute of Auditors
and the Ministry of Finance; from Spain, Banco de Espana and ICAC; from Sweden, the
Ministry of Justice; and from the United Kingdom, the Department of Trade and Industry.
338 See Schaub, supra note 3, at 621; id. at Annex 3. The number of votes is not precisely
proportional to each Member State's population. Germany, with a population of over eighty
million, has the same number of votes as France, with a population of just under sixty
million.
339 European Commission, Committees at E.U. Level, Accounting Regulatory
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Member States' delegations, wielding at least 232 QMV votes, must vote in
favor of it.340 The Commission is encouraged by the IAS Regulation to
"take into account" such opinions "to the maximum possible extent."
34'
The ARC not only provides advice, but under the comitology procedures
342
its vote has significance. According to Dr. Schaub: "If the ARC does not
vote in favor of a Commission proposal or has no opinion, the
Commission's proposal is sent to the Council of Ministers, which may
approve or reject a proposal within three months. 34 3
c. The Representative Character of the Endorsement Mechanism
The European endorsement mechanism is representative in character.
The ARC's membership includes many entities that represent the interests
of European companies. 344 Although EFRAG's Technical Expert Group is
expected to work independently, it is expected to do so "in the European
interest," and the EFRAG Supervisory Board of European Organizations is
designed to give business interests influence in the endorsement process.
Thus, both EFRAG, particularly through its Supervisory Board, and the
ARC offer E.U. business interests a voice in the adoption of IFRSs in the
European Union.
The existence of the E.U. endorsement mechanism is consistent with
the principles underlying international standard setting. Since international
accounting standards are being created by the IASB, a private, independent
standard setting body that has no authority to impose its standards on any
country, the European Union quite properly has established a mechanism
for assuring that IASB standards fulfill E.U. goals. The European Union, as
a sovereign body, has the right and authority to consider business interests
when deciding whether to adopt IFRSs. Of course, the European Union
also needs to consider the market effects of a decision not to adopt IFRSs,
since failure to adopt IASB standards that have been converged with U.S.
and other national standards may deprive E.U. companies of access to
foreign securities markets.
The combined sovereignty and market approach to convergence of
national accounting standards was explicitly recognized by the IASC
Committee, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/accounting/
committeesen.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
340 Schaub, supra note 3, at 621. Any Member State may also "request confirmation that
Member States representing at least 62 percent of the E.U. population have voted in favour
of the proposal." Id.
341 IAS Regulation, supra note 2, at recital 15.
342 Comitology procedures described, supra Part IV.C.2.
343 Schaub, supra note 3, at 621.
344 See Accounting Regulatory Committee, Summary Report, supra note 337.
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Strategy Working Party when it stated that "there are many roads which
may lead sovereign authorities to converge on a single set of global
standards." 345 The SWP anticipated that "market pressures will encourage
convergence, 346 but recognized that "countries may either reject solutions
required by IAS and require different accounting for these items, or may not
require certain IASC standards to be followed., 347 The concept that each
sovereign nation should have the right to decide whether to adopt IASB
standards is consistent with the SEC approach to the regulation of
international securities markets set forth in a 1988 Policy Statement as
follows:
In seeking solutions to common problems, securities regulators should
be sensitive to cultural differences and national sovereignty concerns.
As regulators seek to minimize differences between systems, the goal of
investor protection should be balanced with the need to be responsive to
the realities of each marketplace.
348
The members of the EFRAG Technical Expert Group appropriately
should cooperate with the IASB to inform the IASB about ways in which
proposed standards will interfere with business operations. However, if the
IASB ultimately disagrees with EFRAG, business and political interests
should not threaten the IASB's independent standard setting structure, but
instead should give their advice to the European Commission in the context
of the endorsement process.
D. European Business Interference with Adoption of IAS Derivatives
Standards
In the IASB agenda, the most controversial standards have been those
dealing with the measurement and reporting of financial instruments,
especially derivatives contracts. In the United States, under FAS 133,
adopted by the FASB in 1998, derivatives contracts, with some exceptions,
must be recorded at fair market value.3 49 Gains and losses in the value of a
derivative are immediately recorded in financial statements, even though no
transaction has occurred. In general, the European practice has been to
345 November 1999 SWP Paper, supra note 73, 12.
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Regulation of
International Securities Markets (Nov. 1988) Commerce Clearing House Inc. Federal
Securities Law Reports (1988 Transfer Binder) at I.
349 ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1998)
[hereinafter FAS 133].
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keep unrealized fluctuations in market value off of financial statements.
350
1. Background
During the late 1990s, at the end of its core standards project, the
IASC, under great pressure to complete its program, adopted most of U.S.
Standard 133 on derivatives. At that time, European companies were not
required to use IASC standards and few did so. In 2001, when the adoption
of IASB standards in the European Union was anticipated, the IASB turned
its attention to its financial instruments standards and undertook projects to
improve the impact on business of IAS 32 and IAS 39. The IASB released
an exposure draft in June 2002351 that set forth improvements for both
standards, IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation)
35 2
and IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement).35 3 As
envisioned by the IASB, IAS 39 dictated fair value accounting for
derivatives, with a few exceptions.354 IAS 39 did not extend fair value to
loans, which still would be measured at historic cost.
355
As the European Union began to move toward the wholesale adoption
of IASB international accounting standards, the prospect of fair value
accounting of derivatives alarmed some European companies, particularly
banks, who charged that the change would introduce unnecessary volatility
in their financial reporting. 356  European banks make extensive use of
derivatives to hedge interest rate risks on loans.357 IAS 39 confronted these
institutions with the choice of accounting for most derivatives by using fair
value methods and or by conforming to strict new criteria for hedges.358
350 See, e.g., Shining a Light on Company Accounts: 'Fair value' accounting for all
financial assets and liabilities is on its way. Banks hate the idea., ECONOMIST, Aug. 18,
2001.
351 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO IAS 32, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: DISCLOSURE AND
PRESENTATION, AND IAS 39, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: RECOGNITION AND MANAGEMENT,
Exposure Draft (Int'l Accounting Standards Bd. 2002) [hereinafter June 2002 Exposure
Draft]. See also Press Release, Int'l. Accounting Standards Bd., International Accounting
Standards Board Proposes Improvements of Financial Instrument Standards (June 20, 2002).
352 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: DISCLOSURE AND PRESENTATION, International Accounting
Standard No. 32 (International Accounting Standards Bd. 2002), available at
http://www.iasc.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
353 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT, International
Accounting Standard No. 39 (International Accounting Standards Bd. 2002), available at
http://www.iasc.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
354 June 2002 Exposure Draft, supra note 351
355 id.
356 See, e.g., Andrew Parker, Regulators Push for Tougher Accounting Rules, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2003 (Barclays pre-tax profits of £3.6B in 2001 would have been inflated by £449M
in derivatives gains under U.S. GAAP).
357 id.
358 Sean Togher, IMS 39: Making Securitization Transparent, RISK MGMT., Aug. 1, 2003.
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For a derivative to be held as a hedge, IAS 39 required a demonstration of
effectiveness-that it would mitigate or eliminate the risk inherent in a
particular asset.359 Making the demonstration would be difficult because of
the number and complexity of the derivatives-based financial structures in
use.36 0 The application of IAS 39 to European banks raised the possibility
that derivatives used as macro hedges-that is, used to hedge entire
portfolios, rather than matched to specific risks-would not be treated as
effective hedges and would be denied hedge accounting treatment.361 The
central complaint was that IAS 39 would have a negative effect on the risk
management strategies of European companies, particularly banks.362
When similar rules had been introduced in the United States in June
2000,363 most U.S. banks had abandoned macro hedging and instituted
focused and specific hedges. Accounting staffs were expanded in order to
comply with stringent, complicated new hedging rules.
364
2. The Case for Fair Value Accounting for Derivatives
The IASB believed fair value accounting for derivatives necessary
both to improve standard quality and to promote convergence. IAS 39 itself
explained that "derivative contracts create rights and obligations that meet
the definition of assets and liabilities and, as a result, should be valued as
assets and liabilities in a bank's accounts using fair value or mark to market
calculations. 3 65 The IASB also saw the changes of IAS 39 as necessary to
make IFRSs acceptable to the SEC. Without fair value accounting for
derivatives, the IASB believed the SEC would not drop its requirement that
non-U.S. companies provide financial statements using U.S. GAAP and
would not allow IASB standards to be used for registration of securities in
the United States.36 6
359 June 2002 Exposure Draft, supra note 351.
360 See Adriana Arai, E. U. Companies Forced to Swallow New Derivatives Rule Book,
Dow Jones Indus. News, June 19, 2003 (quoting PriceWaterhouseCoopers partner Peter
Holgate, noting that even "pretty simple structures" would not qualify as hedges under IAS
39).
361 See Andrew Peaple, European Banks Face Daunting Derivatives Rules, WALL ST. J.
EUROPE, June 12, 2003.
362 See Francisco Guerrero, Andrew Parker and Charles Pretzlik, Brussels Sticks to its
Guns, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003.
363 Introduction, FAS 133, supra note 349.
364 See Adriana Arai, E. U. Companies Forced to Swallow New Derivatives Rule Book,
supra note 360.
365 European Banks Hopeful of Deal with IASB on Derivatives, Market News Int'l, Apr.
25, 2003.
366 See Andrew Parker, Regulators Push for Tougher Accounting Rules, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2003 (citing IASB chair Sir David Tweedie's claim that the United States would not drop
its requirement for E.U. companies to produce accounts under U.S. GAAP if Europe failed
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3. Endorsement Problems and IASB Responses
In June 2002, EFRAG's Techical Expert Group recommended to the
European Commission the adoption of the IASB's entire body of standards
as it stood.367 It observed that IAS 39 "gives rise to ... difficulties," but
noted that the IASB was rewriting the standard.368 Corporate opposition to
IASs 32 and 39 began to surface in the fall of 2002.369 It was matched by
opposition to IASs 32 and 39 among the delegations of the Accounting
Regulatory Committee.370 The Commission missed its self-imposed
deadline-the end of 2002-for endorsing the entire set of standards. It
announced that it would delay the endorsement until the following June.37 1
In response, the IASB decided to hold public hearings on IAS 39.372 When
the hearings began in the late winter of 2003, it became clear that European
banks strongly opposed fair value accounting for derivatives.373
In April 2003, the IASB's position on hedging was that "hedge
accounting should be possible only where a clear link is established
between derivatives and particular assets or liabilities. 374 On April 28, the
IASB met in London with senior banking executives and representatives of
the European Banking Federation (EBF). 7 The EBF asked the IASB to
modify IAS 39, relaxing hedge definition rules to allow macro hedging-
to adopt IAS 39).
367 Comment letter from EFRAG to John F. Mogg, Director-General of the Internal
Market (June 19, 2002), available at http://www.iasplus.com/resource/efrg0206.pdf
[hereinafter EFRAG endorsement letter].
368 Id.
369 See Andrew Parker, Regulators push for tougher accounting rules, supra note 366
(reporting that French finance minister Francis Mer had voiced skepticism about fair-value
accounting to Sir David Tweedie during a September 2002 meeting).
370 See Accounting Regulatory Committee, Summary Record, Meeting of the Accounting
Regulatory Committee (Nov. 6, 2002), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
internal marketlaccounting/docs/arc/20021 1-surmmary-record-en.pdf, at Agenda Point 3
(reporting that "[a]ll Member States agreed that it was essential to send a clear message to
the IASB on the need to thoroughly reconsider IAS 39 beyond the proposed improvements
project.")
371 See Andrew Parker, EU Plans on Accounting Under Threat, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003.
372 See Andrew Parker, Regulators Push for Tougher Accounting Rules, supra note 366.
373 See id. (characterizing banks as "leading the fight" against fair-value accounting for
derivatives); Francesco Guerrera and Andrew Parker, EU is Warned not to Reject
Derivatives Rule, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003 (quoting IASB vice-chair Tom Jones, at the
Brussels hearing, as claiming that convergence would be undermined if the European Union
did not adopt IAS 39); Andrew Parker, European Banks Slam Derivatives Proposals, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003 (reporting that BNP Paribas CFO had suggested that perhaps the fair-
value measurements of hedge derivatives could be reported in the footnotes of financial
statements, but that the idea had been rejected by IASB research director Wayne Upton).
374 Andrew Parker, Bankers Set for IASB Talks, FN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003.
375 See European Banks Hopeful of Deal with 1ASB on Derivatives, MARKET NEWS INT'L,
Apr. 25, 2003.
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the hedging of entire portfolios of assets and liabilities. 376 In a mid-June
vote the IASB accepted this idea. 377 Citing its discussion with the EBF, the
IASB announced that it would produce an exposure draft of changes to IAS
39 that would allow macro hedging.378 On August 21, 2003, the IASB
published Exposure Draft 6 (ED 6) on macro hedging, as promised.379
The proposals in ED 6 regarding the availability of hedge accounting
and the standards used to judge the effectiveness of hedges were still not
acceptable to some European economic interests.38° Moreover, banks still
complained that fair value accounting would create too much volatility.
The meetings between the IASB and representatives of the banking
industry, which had been ongoing since February 2003, were broken off
shortly after the announcement of the IASB's compromise on macro
hedging.381
On July 4, 2003, French President Jacques Chirac weighed in on the
controversy. In a letter to Commission President Romano Prodi, he charged
that fair value accounting for derivatives would have "nefarious
consequences for financial stability. '382
On July 16, 2003, the Accounting Regulatory Committee voted to
recommend all IFRSs except IASs 32 and IAS 39.383 The chair of the
meeting "insisted on the need for the IASB and the banking and insurance
industries to find an acceptable solution for lASs 32 and 39 as soon as
possible. 384
376 Id. (quoting Wilfried Wilms of the EBF: "The problem is the current Standard [lAS
39] doesn't have any room for macro hedging, because you're hedging either assets or
liabilities, but not a combination of both and that is the tricky part. The IASB does not see a
solution that will fit with its principles, but we say our solution can.")
311 IASB, IASB Insight, June 2003, at 5 (reporting that the IASB had adopted "an
approach that has been developed largely as a result of meetings between representatives of
the IASB and representatives of the European Banking Federation (FBE).")
378 See EC remains unyielding on IASB's proposed derivatives standards, THE
ACCOUNTANT, July 22, 2003.
379 IAS 39 MACRO HEDGING, Exposure Draft 6 (Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., 2003);
see also Andrew Parker, IASB to Ease Draft Rules for EU banks, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2003.
380 See Paul Chisnall, Financial reporting - Financial instruments: Financial - A final
opportunity on ]AS 32 and lAS 39, ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 1, 2003 at 83 (explaining remaining
areas of conflict between IASB and economic interests after ED 6 had been issued); Andrew
Parker, IASB to Ease Draft Rules for EU Banks, supra note 379.
381 See Simon Clow and Andrew Peaple, Banks' Talks with IASB Break Down, WALL ST.
J. EUROPE, June 26, 2003.
382 Daniel Dombey, Andrew Parker and Bettina Wassener, 1ASB to 'Stand Firm'
Following French Attack, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2003.
383 Accounting Regulatory Committee, Summary Record, Meeting of the Accounting
Regulatory Committee of 16 July 2003, available at http://www.iasplus.com/resource/
0307arc.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
384 Id. at 2. See also Financial Reporting-IFRS Countdown-Burning Issues,
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The European Commission, following the ARC's recommendation,
adopted a regulation endorsing all of the IASB's then-existing standards
except IAS 32 and IAS 39.385 IAS 32 and IAS 39, explained the European
Commission, were "not included because they are currently in the process
of being revised by the International Accounting Standards Board... in co-
operation with European accounting experts. 386  Commissioner Frits
Bolkestein, who was responsible for accounting issues in his position as the
Commissioner charged with supervising the European Commission's
Internal Markets Directorate-General, said: "I encourage the IASB and
interested parties to continue their dialogue on lASs 32 and 39, so that the
Commission will then be in a position to consider these standards too, in
time for 2005." 3 87
During the fall of 2003, European economic interests waged an
extensive lobbying campaign in the European Parliament, advocating that
the Parliament pressure the Commission to reject lASs 32 and 39.388 The
IASB was criticized for failure to yield to the demands of European
389companies.
By this time the European failure to endorse the standards had begun
to have effects beyond the derivatives standards. Some observers feared
that the time-consuming consultation and standard revision the IASB had
performed regarding the derivatives standards might cause it to miss its
deadline for finalizing other standards.39°
On December 17, 2003, the IASB released definitive versions of lASs
32 and 39--definitive except for the macro hedging portion of IAS 39.391
The standards remained largely unchanged. Sir David Tweedie warned that
ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 20, 2003 (reporting that the ARC asked the Commission to "request the
IASB to continue its dialogue with representatives of European industries in order to find a
satisfactory and timely solution for the revised IAS 32 and IAS 39.")
385 Press Release, European Commission, Financial reporting: Commission adopts





388 See John House, Financial Reporting-IASB-Ready or not?, ACCOUNTANCY, Aug.
31, 2003.
389 See, e.g., Peter Williams, Accounting-Making Enemies in High Places,
AccountancyAge.com, at http://www.accountancyage.com/features/l135899 (Dec. 17,
2003) (reporting that a French insurance executive had termed Sir David Tweedie and the
IASB staff "Ayatollah accountants").
390 See id.
391 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: PRESENTATION AND DISCLOSURE, International Accounting
Standard 32 (Int'l Accounting Standards Board, 2003); INT'L AcCT. STANDARDS BD., IAS 39:
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT, International Accounting
Standard 32 (Int'l Accounting Standards Bd. 2003).
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if the European Union failed to adopt the derivatives standards the
attractiveness of European corporations to investors would suffer, as would
prospects for convergence. 
3 92
On January 19, 2004, Commissioner Bolkestein told the IASB to omit the
"remaining conflictual issues" from its final and complete version
(incorporating the macro hedging rules) of IAS 39, which was scheduled
for release in March, unless it could reach "broad agreement" with bank
representatives.393  E.U. finance ministers voiced their approval of
Commissioner Bolkestein's statement on January 20, 2004. 394 But at its
January 2004 meeting the IASB voted against further changes to IAS 39.395
On February 10, 2004, at the European Commission's request, the
European Consultative Group on Accounting Issues was formed. 396 The
Consultative Group was to include representatives of the European Central
Bank, the European banking and insurance industries, and European
regulators of those industries.397 Commissioner Bolkestein said that the
Consultative Group would examine the disputed sections of IAS 39 that
could not be resolved by March. 398
At its February meeting, the IASB voted to change IAS 39's
application of fair value accounting in another significant way. As an effort
to allow companies to use fair values other than in hedging transactions,
IAS 39 had permitted fair value accounting for any financial instrument,
whether an asset or a liability, if a company wished. In response to
suggestions from Commissioner Bolkestein, the IASB voted to prepare an
amendment to restrict this permissiveness.39 9
Despite the IASB's offer to abandon IAS 39's permissive fair value
392 Andrew Parker, Warning to Opponents of Derivatives Rules, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2003 (quoting Sir David: "The big danger for Europe is if IASB and FASB have the same
standards-which we hope in just a few years we will-for someone having domething
different the big question the market is going to ask is 'why?' That is something that scares
people. If you are a multinational and you have to do something - a watered down version -
people are going to ask the question: 'What is in there that we cannot see?')
393 Daniel Dombey, IASB set to Rebuff Brussels on Rules, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004.
394 Id.
'9' IASB, 1ASB Update, Jan. 2004, at 4.
396 Press Release, IASB, European Consultative Group on Accounting Issues Affecting
Financial Institutions to be Created (Feb. 10, 2004). See also Andrew Parker, IASB Creates
Advisory Group at EC's Request, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004; Patrick Tracey, New IASB
Advisory Forum Created to Strengthen European Bankers' Input, BNA's BANKING REP.,
Feb. 16, 2004.
397 Id.
398 Parker, supra note 396.
'99 IASB, IASB Update, Feb. 2004, at I (reporting the IASB's decision that "whilst
preserving the key benefits of the [fair value] option it would explicitly limit the use of the
option to specified situations.") See also Patrick Tracey, IASB Bends to European Pressures
to Scale Back Fair Value for Derivatives, BNA's BANKING REP., Feb. 23, 2004.
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provision, Commissioner Bolkestein insisted on further changes in IAS 39.
On March 2, he said, "I am still convinced that temporary solutions can be
found in the short term, pending longer-term work by the IASB. I have
urged Sir David Tweedie to continue working in the short term with
technical experts - around the clock if necessary - to try to find such
appropriate solutions. ''4°
On March 31, the IASB incorporated the macro hedging amendment
contained in ED 6 into IAS 39. 401 In response, the European Commission
called for further concessions.4 °2 It imposed a new deadline, June 2004, for
the resolution of the disagreements between the IASB and the banking
industry.40 3 On March 31, the IASB announced that it would form a
working party including representatives of the EBF to review IAS 39.404
True to its February suggestion, on April 21, 2004, the IASB published
an exposure draft containing a fair value limitation amendment to IAS
39.405
4. The European Commission 's Carve-Out
Beginning on June 9, 2004, a body called the "High Level Group on
IAS 39," made up of representatives of the European Commission, the
IASB, and business interests, began trilateral negotiations.40 6  The IASB
agreed in principle to presentational changes. 407 Under the compromise,
companies would report equity values the traditional way, with a special
disclosure for changes in values of derivatives. The IASB also agreed to
consider a bank-sponsored proposal for the expansion of hedging.40 8
Even after the IASB agreed to presentational changes, banking
400 Andrew Parker, Bolkestein Urges Solutions on Standards, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004.
401 IASB, IASB Insight, Apr./May 2004, at 1. See also IASB Sets Derivatives Accounting
Rules Despite Firms 'Doubts, THE ACCOUNTANT, Apr. 30, 2004.
402 Andrew Parker, Brussels Delivers Standards Deadline, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004.
403 European Banks and lAS 39: Time to Settle the Account, EUROPEAN BANKER, Apr. 30,
2004.
404 Andrew Parker, Bankers Change Tone with IASB, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004.
405 lAS 39: THE FAIR VALUE OPTION, Exposure Draft (Int'l Accounting Standards Bd.
2004); See also Still not Tallying - Accounting Standards, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 2004, at 69.
406 See Banking Experts Meet to Hammer Out Derivatives Compromise, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS, June 9, 2004.
407 Juliane Von Reppert-Bismark, EU Derivatives Vote is Delayed, THE WALL ST. J.
EUR., July 12, 2004.
408 See Accounting Regulatory Committee, Summary Record, Meeting of the Accounting
Regulatory Committee of 14 June 2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/accounting/docs/arc/2004-06-14-summary-record en.pdf, at 2-3. See also
EU Commission: Outlook on Derivatives Rule 'Hopeful,' Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, June 9,
2004 [hereinafter Outlook on Derivatives Rule].
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interests wanted to stall the endorsement process. 40 9 In a June 11 letter, the
EBF asked the Commission to postpone its decision until more progress had
been made in the negotiations. The letter argued that "[t]he strengthening
of the European capital markets resulting from the application of
international accounting standards can only be achieved if Europe ensures
that the standards developed by the IASB are suited to European market
conditions." 
410
On June 14, 2004, the Accounting Regulatory Committee met to
consider whether to endorse IAS 39. After members had been briefed on
the proposed presentational changes, fifteen countries voted yes, six stated
no opinion, and four-France, Italy, Spain and Belgium-voted no. 4 1 1 In
response, the European Commission chose to delay its final decision on
standard endorsement still further, asking the national governments
represented in the ARC to submit formal opinions by the end of June. 412
In July 2004, EFRAG's Technical Expert Group voted on whether to
endorse IAS 32 and IAS 39. The Technical Expert Group issued an
endorsement of IAS 32.4' 3 Five of the eleven members voted in favor of
endorsing IAS 39 and six against.4 14 Since EFRAG's due process requires
the approval of a majority of the Technical Expert Group to endorse a
standard, IAS 39 was neither approved nor rejected.
The European Commission next proposed what became known as a
"carve-out"--endorsing portions of IAS 39 and not endorsing other
portions.415 The carve-out involved two issues: the fair value option and the
409 See EU Set to Miss Deadline for New Derivative Accounting Rule, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, June 11, 2004.
410 See EU Veto on Derivatives Standard Threatens Move to 1AS by 2005, THE
ACCOUNTANT, June 30, 2004.
411 Outlook on Derivatives Rule, supra note 408. Their weighted votes were sufficient to
block the endorsement. See France and Three Others Veto Derivatives Accounting Deal,
DOW JONES INT'LNEWS, June 14, 2004.
412 Floyd Norris, 4 European Nations Object to Bank Accounting Shift, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2004, at C12.
413 Letter from EFRAG to Dr. Alexander Schaub, Director General, European
Commission Directorate for the Internal Market (July 8, 2004) (endorsement of IAS 32)
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/accounting/iasen.htm#efrag-advice.
414 Letter from EFRAG to Dr. Alexander Schaub, Director General, European
Commission Directorate for the Internal Market (July 8, 2004) (non-endorsement of IAS 39)
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/accounting/iasen.htm#efrag-advice.
415 European Commission, Proposal for a Draft Commission Regulation, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/accounting/docs/ias/2004-09-ias39-proposal_
en.pdf (Sept. 7, 2004); European Commission, Revised Proposal for a Draft Commission
Regulation, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/accounting/docs/ias/
revised-2004-09-ias39-proposal en.pdf (Sept. 28, 2004); Accounting Regulatory Committee,
Summary Report, Meeting of the Accounting Regulatory Committee, Jul. 9, 2004, available
at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/accounting/docs/arc/2004-07-09-
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portfolio hedging of core deposits. The Commission proposed a non-
endorsement of the portions of IAS 39 dealing with the fair value option
because it felt that a final version of the IASB's proposed elimination of the
fair value option4 6 would not be incorporated into IAS 39 before the end of
2004.417 With regard to hedging, the Commission felt that the IASB's
concession on macro hedging had been insufficient and that the hedge
effectiveness testing requirements of IAS 39 were too restrictive and
difficult to meet. It therefore proposed not to endorse the portions of IAS
39 that dealt with effectiveness testing. 41 8 The ARC approved the carve-out
on October 10.
4 19
The Commission formally endorsed the carved-out IAS 39 by
regulation on November 19, 2004.420 The regulation stated that
[IL]t is the objective of the Commission to have a stable platform of
international accounting standards in place as from 1 January 2005.
However, certain important provisions in IAS 39 are still the subject of
unfinished discussions between the IASB, the European Central Bank,
prudential supervisors and the banking industry. These provisions relate
to the option to fair value all financial assets and liabilities and to hedge
accounting. Each of theses provisions concern areas which are
completely autonomous, distinct and separate from the rest of the
standard. In order to respect the date of 1 January 2005, it is necessary
to introduce IAS 39 with the exception of these provisions.
421
The Commission characterized the carve-out as a temporary solution
to be revisited when the IASB came to agreement with the European
banking industry, and stressed the "exceptional nature" of the situation.422
According to Director-General Schaub,
summary-record en.pdf, at 1 (reporting that the Commission was exploring the possibility of
the carve-out because "the [European] Union had to remedy the inability of both the
International Accounting Standards Board and the European banking industry, after 2 years
of long and painful discussions, to come to a mutually satisfactory solution on portfolio
hedging of core deposits.")
416 Discussed supra Part IV.D.3.
417 Accounting Regulatory Committee, Summary Report, supra note 415, at 2.
418 Id.
419 Accounting Regulatory Committee, Opinion on IAS 39, Oct. 10, 2004, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/accounting/docs/ias/2004- 10-arc-
opinion en.pdf. See also Tobias Buck, EU Backs Move to Sweeten Derivatives Proposal,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004.
420 Commission Regulation No. 2086/2004, O.J. L 363/1 (Nov. 19, 2004). See Floyd
Norris, Europe Closer to Adopting Uniform Accounting Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at
C2.
421 Id. at Recital (4).
422 Accounting Regulatory Committee, Summary Report, supra note 415, at 1-2.
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In carving-out a few positiongs of IAS 39 the Commission was
scrupulous to ensure that no additional text was inserted into the carved-
out standard. On the other hand, it did not wish to postpone IAS 39 until
the IASB was able to resolve the issue... It is the Commission's hope
that after discussion the IASB will be able to come forward very quickly
with a revised standard for IAS 39 that is acceptable to parties
concerned.
423
Meawhile, IAS 32 was approved by the ARC424 and endorsed by
the Commission 425 without further difficulty.
5. Outlook for Convergence
European business interests seem temporarily to have succeeded in
dislodging a standard that was not to their liking, and they have done so by
utilizing the representativeness mode of the E.U. endorsement process.
Despite intense pressure, the IASB has not changed the basic principles that
underlie its derivatives rules. Its IASs 32 and 39 are still internally
consistent and consistent with fair value accounting for derivatives.
Notably the differences between the official IASB versions and the
Commission-endorsed IAS 39 carve-out have resulted from the E.U.
endorsement process and not pressure-induced changes in IASB standards.
The IASB's refusal to succumb to political pressure from business
interests to change its derivatives standard bodes well for the functioning of
international standard setting in the future. Companies that oppose
particular changes in financial reporting standards have been given
substantial opportunity to attempt to persuade the IASB to make changes.
Having failed in that attempt they appropriately have sought instead to seek
modifications through the European Commission endorsement mechanism.
As a result, the IASB's legitimacy as an independent standard setter has
been preserved.
V. CONCLUSION
The events of the past four years suggest that the IASCF Trustees
have been correct in conducting the IASCF's Constitution Review in a
manner that reinforces the IASB's independence. Standard setter
independence is crucial for the international convergence of accounting
423 Schaub, supra note 3, at 622.
424 Accounting Regulatory Committee, Summary Report, Meeting of the Accounting
Regulatory Committee, Nov. 30, 2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/accounting/docs/arc/2004-11-30-summary-record en.pdf, at 1.
425 Commission Regulation No 2337/2004, O.J. L 393/1 (Dec. 31, 2004).
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standards. If business interests can control the standard setting process,
opposition from business interests is likely to prevent convergence.42 6 The
FASB and the IASB have made tremendous progress in converging IASB
standards and U.S. GAAP precisely because neither standards board is
subject to control by business interests. Their independence bodes well for
the success of the worldwide accounting convergence process with its
attendant economic benefits.
Companies that fear the economic effects of particular standards
should have the opportunity to be heard by an independent standard setter.
Both the FASB and the IASB have instituted extensive due process
procedures designed to ensure they receive extensive information about the
real world effects of their standard setting. However, giving business
interests the opportunity to be heard is very different from giving them the
power to control. If, despite opposition from business interests, an
independent standard setter determines that a change in standards is
necessary, it must be allowed to institute the change.
The European derivatives episode suggests that business interest
successes in influencing endorsement or adoption of accounting standards
are likely to delay or impede convergence. Nevertheless, even if businesses
are successful in the short run, in a longer period they are likely to be
subject to market pressure toward convergence from constituencies that
insist on comparable, high-quality accounting standards. Business interests
in Europe succeeded in persuading the European Commission to endorse a
carved-out IAS 39, but the carved-out provisions were not stricken from
that standard by the IASB. As a result, the IASB standards endorsed by the
European Union do not meet the convergence goal. Since IAS 39 as
endorsed in the European Union does not meet the convergence goal, it
seems unlikely that the E.U. standards will be able to be used for cross-
border trading without reconciliation in the derivatives area. As a result, it
can be expected that market pressure will be brought on the European
426 It should also be noted that convergence may eliminate some of the motivation for
business interests to oppose particular accounting standards:
Constituents often complain that a 'tough' standard would put local companies at a
competitive disadvantage relative to companies outside their jurisdiction. Local political
pressures and policies may work against individual national standard setters. An
international standard setting process, independent of political pressures, can establish
financial reporting standards that would apply to all companies in all jurisdictions, thus
eliminating perceived disadvantages.
Sir David Tweedie, Setting a Global Standard: A Case for Accounting Convergence, 25 Nw.
J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 589, 594 (2005).
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Commission to recommend full endorsement, or at least to seek further
compromises with the IASB.427
This article applauds the convergence efforts of the IASB and the
FASB as well as the IASCF's Trustees determination to maintain the
IASB's independence. By remaining independent, the IASB and the FASB
can vigorously continue their effective campaign for the international
convergence of accounting standards. Independent standard setters of the
world working with each other offer great hope for convergence and for the
enormous economic benefits from widespread cross-border trading.
427 This result is made especially likely by the adoption of IFRSs by an increasing
number of jurisdictions outside the E.U. For current statistics on the application of IFRSs,
see Deloitte, Use of IFRSs for Reporting by Domestic Listed Companies, by Country at
http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm#* (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
